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Enforcing the Bill of Rights against the states: the history and the future
―And when you ask them ‗How much should we give?‘
Ooh, they only answer More! More! More!...‖1
Richard L. Aynes*

The question of whether the Bill of Rights—the first eight amendments to the U.S.
Constitution—should be applied to and enforced against the states has a long, and in some sense,
complex history. Though, as this symposium will demonstrate, there is a difference between
unanimity and consensus, Professor Randy Barnett has concluded:
―There is now a scholarly consensus that the
original meaning of ‗privileges or
immunities‘ includes the Bill of Rights.‖

2

A similar conclusion has been reached by Professor Calvin Massey:
―[M]ost of the substantive guarantees of the Bill of Rights have been . . . .
made applicable to the state‖ and ―this debate is now over for all practical
purposes.‖ 3
As our keynote speaker, Michael Kent Curtis, noted, over the last decade the strength of the
evidence supporting the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states has increased as more
and more information has been uncovered. 4
*John F. Seiberling Chair of Constitutional Law and Director of the Constitutional Law Center at the
University of Akron, School of Law. The Constitutional Law Center was one of four established by the
U.S. Congress in order to commemorate the Bi-Centennial of the U.S. Constitution in 1987. See
http://www.uakron.edu/law/cclaw.php. Comments and suggestions can be sent to raynes@uakron.edu.
A prior version of this paper was presented to the Symposium of the University of San Diego School of
Law on Incorporation January 7, 2009. This symposium was co-sponsored by the University of San Diego
Institute for the Study of Constitutional Originalism. Special thanks to Professor Donald A. Dripps, who
organized this important symposium, and to all of the contributors who helped advance our knowledge and
thoughts about these important issues. I want to also thank Professor Michael Kent Curtis for commenting
upon a prior version of this paper. The views expressed and any errors are, of course, my own.
1

Creedence Online, Creedence Lyrics: Fortunate Son, http://www.creedenceonline.net/lyrics/fortunate_son.php (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).
2
RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES IN CONTEXT 292 (2008) (emphasis added).
3
CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 445-47 (2d. ed. 2005).
4
―The more one looks, the more one finds.‖ Michael Kent Curtis, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES ___
(2009). As Professor Wildenthal has pointed out, there are some problems with the use of the term
―incorporation.‖ Bryan Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Scholarship and Commentary on the

1

The purpose of the article is to paint—in broad strokes—the ebb and flow of the debate in
order to try to identify where we are and what the next frontiers of fourteenth amendment
scholarship might be.
I.
Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment
There have always been citizens, lawyers, and judges who believed that the Bill of Rights
had application to the states. This is not surprising since those rights are part of our common law
heritage. As early as 1819 Justice William Johnson, a Jeffersonian appointee to the Court,
―obliquely suggested‖ 5 that the seventh amendment guarantee of civil jury trials was applicable
to the states. 6 A year later, in Houston v. Moore, 7 Justice Johnson wrote that the provision
against double-jeopardy ―operates equally upon both‖ the state and the federal governments. 8
In 1829 one of America‘s leading lawyers, William Rawle,9 published one of the first
treatises on the American Constitution in which he utilized a textual analysis that concluded that
only the First Amendment was limited to the federal government. Because the other amendments

Fourteenth Amendment in 1867-73, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES ____ n.2 (2009). Though the term
―incorporate by reference‖ is a common legal term, one of the early, if not the first, uses of the term
―incorporation‖ in the context of applying the Bill of Rights to the states is found in Coates v. Lawrence, 46
F. Supp. 414 (S.D. Ga. 1942). This was not a term that any of the framers or ratifiers used. I agree that
―nationalizing‖ the Bill of Rights is a better use of terminology and, yet, prefer ―enforcing‖ the Bill of
Rights against the states or ―applying‖ the Bill of Rights protections to the states. For further thoughts on
the problems with the term ―incorporation‖ see Kurt T. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES ___, (2009) (Draft at 1) (―. . . it is time to abandon the metaphor of incorporation altogether
. . . Our search is for the public understanding of texts added to the Constitution in 1868.‖).
A further problem is that though the application of the Bill of Rights against the state is commonly held
to be part of ―substantive due process,‖ this only goes to establish the poverty of the terminology. It can
hardly be said that the right to receive notice of the charges against one or the right to a speedy trial is a
―substantive‖ right rather than a procedural right. It should be noted that the distinction between
substantive and procedural due process is an anachronism when applied to the Fourteenth Amendment. See
STUART STREICHLER, JUSTICE CURTIS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (2005). I am grateful to Assistant Law
Librarian Annette Souare and her staff who determined that the first time the term ―substantive due
process‖ was used by the Supreme court was in Republic National Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90
(1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting), and the first time the terms ―substantive due process‖ and ―procedural due
process‖ were used in the same decision was in Shaughnessy v. United State ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
222-27 (1953) (Justice Jackson, dissenting).
5
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 145 (1998).
6
Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. 235, 240-42 (1819).
7
18 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1820) (separate opinion).
8
Id. Akhil Amar notes that ―even here his statement was not free from ambiguity.‖ AMAR, supra note 5, at
145.
9
Rawle had been George Washington‘s first choice for U.S. Attorney General and when Rawle turned the
position down, Washington appointed him U.S. District Attorney for Philadelphia. For biographical
information on Rawle and his prominence, see Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1197, 1247 (1995).
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were written in general terms, Rawle concluded that they all were enforceable against the states.
10

Fuller accounts including more state and federal court examples of these pre-Barron
opinions are found in many works, including those of William W. Crosskey11 and Akhil Amar. 12
Crosskey argued that Barron was wrongly decided, 13 but Professor Amar collectively refers to
people holding these views as ―The Barron Contrarians.‖ 14
One might imagine that claims that the Bill of Rights applied to the states would have ceased
after Chief Justice Marshall‘s decision in Barron v. Baltimore.15 This would seem to be
especially warranted by the fact that Barron was followed by at least eleven Supreme Court cases
between 1840 and 1866. 16
But such was not the case and post-Barron instances are also documented by
Crosskey17 and Amar. 18 Though there are undoubtedly many reasons for this, at least one of them
is that the people of that generation were not as court-centric as many scholars and judges are
today. Further, in some instances, lawyers and judges were simply unaware of the decision in
Barron.19 In some instances, lawyers and judges thought that Barron was wrongly decided.20 In
yet other instances, the Courts may not have found the Bill of Rights to be binding, but
nevertheless concluded that they were declaratory of general principles of constitutional law and
common law that applied to the states as constitutional principles. 21
II.

10

WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 125, 127, 135 (1829 2d. ed.)
(1970 reprint).
11
William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, ―Legislative History,‖ and the Constitutional limitations
on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 125-131 (1954).
12
AMAR, supra note 5, at 145-162.
13
Crosskey, supra note 11, at 119.
14
AMAR, supra note 5, at 145.
15
32 U.S. 243 (1833).
16
Citations to these cases, involving the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments, are found
in AMAR, supra note 5, at 354 n.41.
17
Crosskey, supra note 11, at 141-43.
18
AMAR, supra note 5, at 149-155.
19
For example, in the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment Congressman Robert S. Hale (R-NY), a
New York State Court judge from 1856-1864, was unaware of the holding of Barron and thought the Bill
of Rights was already enforceable against the states. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (Feb. 27,
1866). For Bingham‘s reply to Hale see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (Feb. 27, 1866). For
other examples involving members of the constitutional convention in Nevada and the Supreme Court of
Illinois, see Aynes, supra note 9. CHI-KENT L. REV. at 1247 n.326.
20
AMAR, supra note 5, at 153 (citing the example of former New Hampshire Governor C. P. Van Ness
arguing to the U.S. Supreme Court that ―an error was committed by the Court . . . ‖ in Holmes v. Jennison,
39 U.S. 540, 555 (1840)).
21
Nunn v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 243, 250 (1846). See AMAR, supra note 5, at 149-155 (collecting and quoting
cases).

3

In the 39th Congress
Citizens who believed they had, or should have, protection against the states under the Bill of
Rights included an overwhelming majority of the 39th Congress. 22 Indeed, though they differed
on the question of whether the Congress has the power to enforce the Bill of Rights against the
states, almost to a person the Republican members of Congress believed that the Bill of Rights
was applicable to the states. The account of a series of Congressional actions designed to
implement that belief begins with the Freedman‘s Bureau.
The account of how the Freedman‘s Bureau, the ―Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and
Referees and other persons,‖ legislated the protection of rights contained in the Bill of Rights
begins in the chronological middle. The legislation of July 16, 1866 continued the prior March 3,
1865 legislation for two additional years.23 Its 14th clause provided that ―all citizens‖ would
enjoy a number of rights necessary to engage in life in 19th century society as a free person.24 But
immediately after listing a number of specific rights, the legislation continued ―to have the full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and
the acquisition, enjoyment, and the disposition of estate, real and personal, including the
constitutional right to bear arms . . . .‖

25

This provision is revealing on at least three levels. First, the terms ―full and equal‖ tell us that
there was both a substantive and equality guarantee. If this were only an equality provision, there
would be no need for the use of the term ―full.‖ 26 As we think about what ―proceedings‖ would
guarantee ―personal liberty and personal security,‖ we immediately think about those which
follow due process and the rights guaranteed against the federal government in the second, fourth,
fifth, sixth, seventh and eight amendments, or, more commonly (most) of the Bill of Rights. This
normal and natural reading of Section 14 is confirmed by the last clause quoted which says that

22

For a tentative account of the workings of the 39th Congress see Richard L. Aynes, The 39th Congress
(1865-1867) and the Fourteenth Amendment: Some Preliminary Perpsectives, 42 AKRON L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009).
23
14 Stat. 173 (1866).
24
―. . . the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property. . .‖ Id. at 176. Senator Trumbull (R-Ill.) based
Congress‘ power to enact the Freedman‘s Bureau upon the Thirteenth Amendment, the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the authority over naturalization. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 504 (Jan. 30, 1866). House Judiciary Chairman James Wilson (R-Iowa), indicated that the
Committee had changed the description of the beneficiaries from ―inhabitants of‖ to ―citizens of the United
States in . . .‖ CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (Mar. 9, 1866). This new terminology was
consistent with Bingham‘s reading of the ellipses in Article IV and was likely the result of trying to
conform the statute to Article IV, which protected citizens.
25
Id.
26
This plain meaning of the statute is also articulated in AKHIL REED AMAR THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 178-179 (1998) and other sources which Professor Amar cites.

4

these ―full and equal‖ rights ―include . . . .the constitutional right to bear arms.‖ The clause could
have said ―and the constitutional right to bear arms.‖ But the use of the word ―include‖ makes it
clear that the normal reading is correct: it is not limited to the right to bear arms but includes
other similar rights such as those protected by other constitutional amendments.27
We know that this is the case, in part, because its author, Senator Lyman Trumbull (RIll.), Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee and a former Illinois Supreme Court Justice,
indicated that the addition of this explicit protection to the original 1865 act made no change in
the substance of the statute. 28 Moreover, Michael Kent Curtis has documented that this language
had often been used in the past to include the protections of the Bill of Rights.29
From that provision, we can return to the beginning, with the 1865 Freedman‘s Bureau
statute whose language read, in relevant part: ―to have the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the acquisition , enjoyment, and
the disposition of estate, real and personal . . . .‖ From the plain reading of this provision, the
confirmation by Trumbull that this provided the same rights as the 1866 amendment, and the
history of these terms as recounted by Professor Curtis, we know that this 1865 version also
enforced the Bill of Rights against the states. 30
Further, we know that the issue of the enforcement of the rights contained in the Bill of
Rights was a major issue of discussion in the debates over the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
The cornerstone of anti-slavery theory and anti-slavery judicial decisions from at least 1834 until
such litigation became unnecessary in 1865, was a normal textual analysis of Article IV, which
demonstrated that except for the full faith and credit clause of Section 1, there was no power for
27

Professor Curtis has reached a similar conclusion and documented past legal practices in equating the
terms ―personal security and liberty‖ with many of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Michael
Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment: Recalling what the Court Forgot, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 911, 936
(2008).
28
CONG. GLOBE, 39th CONG., 1st Sess. 743 (Feb. 8, 1866) (―I think that does not alter the meaning.‖). I
am grateful to Professor Curtis for calling this statement to my attention. The relationship between the
Bureau and the Amendment, both of which were considered simultaneously in 1866, is shown in Speaker
Schuyler Colfax‘s ruling, in a debate on a vote to override President Johnson‘s veto of the Freedman‘s
Bureau Act. Congressman Bingham (R-Ohio) asked to have placed in the record a newspaper article about
the veto causing ―rejoicing by the people of the South.‖ CONG. GLOBE, 39th CONG., 1st Sess. 1092 (Feb.
28, 1866). When the Democrats objected on relevancy grounds, Speaker Colfax ruled it was relevant
because of the pending Constitutional amendment. He indicated that the Bureau act was ―in regard to the
right of certain persons‖ and that it may be ―within the province of Congress to pass a constitutional
amendment to secure those rights and the rights of others generally . . . .‖ Id.
29
See Curtis, supra note 27, at 923 and n.47 (providing references and authorities to the use of these terms
as a ―shorthand summary of Bill of Rights liberties‖).
30
As Bryan Wildenthal has noted, the Fourteenth Amendment was also intended to ―placed the
constitutionality of the Freedman‘s Bureau . . . beyond doubt.‖ Wildenthal, supra note 4, at ___ {JCLI at
133 and n. 456}; See also JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 201 (1965 ed.). I had highlighted this
in my copy of the book, but had forgotten about it until reminded by Professor Wildenthal article.
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the federal government to enforce Article IV. This being the case, Congress could not enact the
fugitive slave acts and, for purposes of consistency, this theory combined with Barron meant that
Congress also could not enforce the Bill of Rights under Article IV against the states. 31
Just as it had in the Freedmen‘s Bureau Act, the leadership of the House was determined
to provide enforcement for the Bill of Rights against the states through the Civil Rights Act. But
this presented a dilemma for those who fought so long against slavery. Should they support their
prior position and be consistent or should they be pragmatic, adopt a pro-slavery theory, and use
it to support the Bill of Rights?
Congressman John Bingham (R-Ohio), former Chairman of the Judiciary Committee,
Chairman of the House Committee on Reconstruction, and one of the senior members of the
House, maintained the view of the idealists. 32 On March 9, 1866, Bingham stated that the
―enforcement of the bill of rights is the want of the Republic.‖ 33 Bingham noted that he wanted
the Bill of Rights ―enforced everywhere‖ and then expressed his view—the long-established
antislavery view—that this could not be done under the 1866 Civil Rights Act, but could only be
done with a constitutional amendment. 34 Bingham made it clear that he wanted an amendment
―which would arm Congress with the power to compel obedience to the oath [to obey the
constitution], and punish all violations by State officers of the bill of rights . . .‖ 35
The Supreme Court, of course, had rejected this antislavery theory and held in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania,36 that the power to enforce Section IV could be implied and did so in upholding the
fugitive slave acts. In Wilson‘s colorful phrase, he argued that the Congress should ―turn the
artillery of slavery upon itself‖ and use the Prigg precedent to support the cause of freedom by
passing the Civil Rights Act and enforcing the Bill of Rights against the states. 37

31

For a summary of this well known anti-slavery doctrine see Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John
Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L. J. 57, 74-78 (1993) (examining the theory and
tracing the cases in which this theory was utilized— both successfully and unsuccessfully—from 1836 until
right before the war in 1860).
32
Bingham was 51, having been born in 1815. He had served in Congress from 1855 through 1862 and
1865-1866, for a total of nine years as of the time of the proposal of the Amendment. James F. Wilson was
only 38, having been born in 1828. He had served in Congress, as of the date of the proposal of the
Amendment for only five years (1861-1866). Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774Present, available at http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp.
33
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (Mar. 9, 1866) (emphasis added).
34
Id.
35
Id. This speech was re-published in a pamphlet for mass distribution, Hon. John A. Bingham, of Ohio,
Remarks on the Civil Rights Bill, Delivered in the House of Representatives, (Mar. 9, 1866). (OhioLink
search).
36
41 U.S. 539 (1842). Contra, Dennison v. Kentucky, 65 U.S. 66 (1861) overruled Puerto Rico v.
Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987).
37
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (Mar. 1, 1866).
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Bingham‘s desire to have the Bill of Rights enforced against the states was not a secret.
Rather, the speech was summarized in the New York Times38 where the Bill of Rights goal was
spelled out. According to Congressman William Lawrence (R-Ohio), this March 9th speech of
Bingham‘s was ―extensively published.‖39 It was also printed as a pamphlet for mass
distribution.40 Of course, since it was in the Globe, the Senate knew that Bingham had expressed
the view that the Bill of Rights should be enforced against the States. 41 As Wilson made clear:
I find in the bill of rights which the gentlemen [Bingham] wishes to
have enforced by an amendment to the Constitution that ‗no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.‘ I
understand those constitute the civil rights belonging to the citizen in
connection with those which are necessary for the maintenance and perfect
enjoyment of the rights thus specially named . . . . 42
Further, Wilson concluded that ―in relation to the great fundamental rights embraced in the bill of
rights, the citizen being possessed of them is entitled to a remedy.‖ 43
The House agreed with Wilson and, with Bingham voting in the negative, passed the Civil
Rights Act, 111-3844 and passed it again, over President Johnson‘s veto, 122-41. 45 Even
Conservative Republican Senator James Dixon (R-Conn.), who would defect to the Democrats in
1868, thought that the Civil Rights Act protected constitutional rights:
―Congress has given us, in the Civil Rights Act, a
guarantee for free speech in every part of the Union.‖ 46
Thus, between 1865 and 1866 the Congress passed three sequential acts enforcing the Bill of
Rights against the states. Further, these same ideas were also expressed in debate over the
preliminary version of the Fourteenth Amendment in February 1866 and the final version
introduced on May 2, 1866. Moreover, once the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted the
Congress re-enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, making this the fourth statute they had passed
that included enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states. Given the oft-repeated view
38

The Civil Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1866 at 1.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1837 (Apr. 7, 1866).
40
Hon. John A. Bingham of Ohio, On the civil rights bill: delivered in the House of Representatives (1866).
(OhioLink search, July 9, 2008).
41
AMAR, supra note 5, at 1238 n. 200. On the Senate knowing of Bingham‘s role in authoring the
amendment, see Aynes, supra note 31, at 81 n.14 (Senator and future Vice President Henry Wilson (RMass.)).
42
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (Mar. 9, 1866).
43
Id. (emphasis added).
44
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. H.P. 1367 (Mar. 15, 1866).
45
Bingham was one of twenty-one abstentions. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1861 (April 9, 1866).
46
Curtis, supra note 4, (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2332 (May 2, 1866)).
39
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that the Amendment would in some way consitutitonalize the 1866 Act, this provided double
protection for the enforcement of the first eight amendments against the states.
In his speech upon an early version of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham noted that it was
needed because previously ―this immortal bill of rights embodied in the Constitution, rested for
its execution and endorsement hitherto on the fidelity of the states.‖47 The long pre-war struggle,
the war itself, the ―Black Codes‖ that made the Civil Rights Act of 1866 necessary, and
massacres by white police and former Confederate soldiers at Memphis and New Orleans made it
clear that the southern states were untrustworthy and federal enforcement was an absolute
necessity. 48
The New York Times reported the content of the speech: ―This was simply a proposition to
arm the Congress of the United States . . . with power to enforce the Bill of Rights as it stood in
the Constitution.‖ 49 This speech was also put into a pamphlet form. The title page of the
pamphlet listed Bingham‘s name, the fact that the speech was made in the House of
Representatives, the date, and then indicated it was―[i]n support of the proposed amendment to
enforce the Bill of Rights.‖50
On at least six occasions, Bingham specifically said that the Fourteenth Amendment
would enforce the Bill of Rights against the states. 51 He specifically stated that the amendment
would overturn the practical effect of Barron v. Baltimore,52 the Fifth Amendment case where
John Marshall first held for a unanimous Supreme Court that the Bill of Rights did not apply
against the states. Further, he indicated it would overturn Livingston v. Moore,53 a Seventh
Amendment case which followed Barron. At various times in the debates he indicated that the

47

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (Feb. 28, 1866) (emphasis added).
The underlying facts of these events are, in some instances, discussed below. For a summary of this era
of our history see JAMES MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 1-233 (1988), ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION (1988), and ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE, THE STORY OF EMANCIPATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (2005).
49
Washington News, N.Y. T IMES, Mar. 1, 1866 at 5.
50
AMAR, supra note 5, inside of book cover (emphasis added by underlining). Though this speech related
to the earlier version of the Amendment, Bingham‘s speeches make it clear this was a consistent goal.
Also, he viewed the ultimate version of the amendment stronger than the first because it more explicitly
limited the states and also provided enforcement power to Congress. Curtis, supra note 27, at 948 (quoting
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 83 (1871)).
51
See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong.., 1st Sess. App. at 84 (Mar. 31, 1871); CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 2d
Sess. 811 (Jan. 28, 1867); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2541-42 (May 10, 1866); Id. at 1291-92
(Mar. 9, 1866); Id. at 1089-90 (Feb. 28, 1866); Id. at 1034 (Feb. 26, 1866).
52
32 U.S. 243 (1833). As Professor Curtis has pointed out, Senator Howard also described the effects of
Barron, without mentioning it by name, and indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment would produce a
different result. Curtis, supra note 4, at ___. {JCLI Draft p. 30 n. 128(citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2765 (May 28, 1866)). Accord Wildenthal, supra note 4, at ___ {JCLI 128}.
53
32 U.S. 469 (1833).
48
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amendment would prevent future violations of the first, second, fourth, fifth, seventh and eight
amendments.54
All seem to agree that Senator Jacob Howard‘s speech in the Senate indicated that one of
the purposes of the Amendment was to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states. 55
There is support for the statements of floor leaders Bingham and Howard in the ratification
process, showing how the public understood it. The message of Ohio Governor and former
Union General, Jacob Cox, transmitting the proposed Amendment to the Ohio legislature with his
endorsement is well known. Cox described Section 1 as authorizing the national government ―to
protect the citizens of the whole country in their legal privileges and immunities‖ against the
States. According to Cox, this provision was necessary ―long before the war, when it was
notorious that any attempt to exercise freedom of discussion in regard to the system which was
then hurrying on the rebellion was not tolerated.‖ Further, Governor Cox indicated that the
necessity of having ―a reserved right to protect the freedom of the slaves whom the war
emancipated is too palpable for argument.‖ 56
Indeed, one of the key beliefs of Union leaders was that the suppression of free speech had
lead directly to the failure to abolish slavery, the rebellion, and deception to support the rebellion.
In his July 4, 1861 message to Congress, Lincoln indicated that ―[t]here is reason to believe‖ that,
except for South Carolina, a majority of men in every state were for the union and opposed to
secession. 57 After the war, President Andrew Johnson insisted that thousands of people who

54

See Aynes, supra note 31, at 70 n.72 for citations to specific speeches identifying specific constitutional
provisions.
55
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-667 (May 23, 1866). Some writers have tried to diminish the
importance of Howard‘s speech or draw unsupported inferences from it. I treat those claims below. See
infra Section VII, B.
56
Ohio Executive Documents, 57th Gen. Assembly 281-282 (1867) (emphasis added). Professor Thomas
quotes portions of this document, Thomas, supra note ____, at {Draft 38. Still in his paper?}. But he then
attempts to minimize its importance by saying that enforcing the Bill of Rights ―was a knife that cuts both
ways . . . .‖ Id. He next cites Democratic concerns about lack of free speech in the south by former
Confederates to criticize the reconstruction.
There are two answers to this. The Fourteenth Amendment would have no effect upon federal institutions
such as the U.S. Army and the Freedmen‘s Bureau that were working the south or in areas where the writ
of habeas corpus has been suspended. Further, if he is correct, then this should have led the elitist white
former slaveholders to support the Fourteenth Amendment. We know from the actions of Democratic
leaders like Senator Reverdy Johnson (D-Md.) and Senator Thomas A. Hendricks (D-Ind.), that this was
not the case. See infra note 292. Second, Bingham made it clear that even traitors were ―persons‖ who
would benefit from the protection of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, though he did note
that in his opinion ―[t]hey ought to thank God they are permitted to live anywhere on this side of the
deepest hell.‖ AYNES THE HISTORY OF OHIO LAW 390 (Michael Les Benedict and John F. Winkler eds..
year) (quoting Bingham‘s 1866 speech at Bowerston, Ohio).
57
Special Message to Congress, July 4, 1861, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865
(Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed. 1984).
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were involved in the rebellion were ―deluded, [and] deceived‖ by a small group of instigators.‖

58

As late as 1871 Congressman Bingham told voters that he knew that ―hundreds of thousands of
the Southern people‖ had been loyalists and gave support to the rebellion only after resistance to
it was impossible. 59
Not surprisingly, these same views were expressed on the campaign trail and recorded in
newspapers during the 1866 Congressional elections. On August 6, 1866 the ―eloquent‖ speech
of Bingham was reported in the Cincinnati Gazette and a number of other papers.60 In this speech
Bingham‘s discussion of the privilege and immunities clause indicated that ―[f]reedom of
conscience is one of the privileges of the citizen and [of] the United States‖ and that ―men are not
to be put to torture, sent to the dungeons or made to walk the narrow steps of the scaffold for
teaching their children the holy precepts of our Lord and Master.‖ 61 Further, Bingham invoked
antiestablishment clause principles, affirming that ―we do not ally the church and the State . . .
.‖62
Another newspaper account of an 1866 Congressional campaign speech by Bingham was
his August 24, 1866 speech in Bowerstown, Ohio. This speech was published in the Cincinnati
Commercial and republished in its book Speeches of the Campaign of 1861 in Ohio, Indiana, and
Kentucky.63 The headline in the Commercial was ―The Constitutional Amendment Discussed by
its Author.‖ In his discussion of the Amendment Bingham indicated that it ―imposed a limitation
on the States to correct their abuses of power‖ and was ―essential to the nation‘s life.‖ Bingham
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Aynes, supra note 56, at 373.
One of the ways in which this makes sense is that even Unionists—or maybe especially Unionists—were
drafted into the Confederate Army. A common strategy was to assign them to some unit away from the
home to prevent them from deserting and denying them support from their families. Examples of this are
provided A.W. BISHOP, LOYALTY ON THE FRONTIER OR SKETCHES OF UNION MEN IN THE SOUTHWEST 128131 (1863) (one example involved the arrest of 77 Unionists who were marched in chains to Little Rock
and given the choice of being hung or serving in the rebel army; only ten were still living by the time of
the Battle of Shiloh and these men were all placed in the front lines because they were considered
unreliable; all but two were killed during the battle and one of those who survived was wounded; he
eventually was able to escape into Union lines and enlisted in the First Arkansas Cavalry, a Union
Regiment). Over 100,000 white Union soldiers came from southern states. RICHARD N. CURRENT,
LINCOLN‘S LOYALISTS 218 (1992) (giving an account of prior estimates and how he arrived at this figure).
60
Cadiz (Ohio) Republican, Aug.16, 1866, indicating that the original speech was reported in the
Cincinnati Gazette and was being reprinted in the Republican. See also Cincinnati Daily Commercial,
Aug. 10, 1866 at 1 quoted in Gerald N. Magliocca, Indians and Invaders; The Citizenship Clause and
Illegal Aliens, 10 J. OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 499, 518 n.92 (2008) which seems to be quoting this same
speech.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
[hereinafter CAMPAIGN SPEECHES]. The book was published by the Cincinnati Commercial in 1866. It
was obviously published after the election because the last portion of the book gives the results of the
election. But this means that the book may still have played a role in the ratification of the Amendment.
Of course, the original articles played a role in the Congressional elections of 1866.
59
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declared the adoption of the Amendment ―essential‖ to the peace and safety of the Republican. In
part of his discussion he indicated that the state would no longer be able to ―take away freedom of
speech‖ or imprison people for ―teaching their fellow man that there is a hereafter, and a reward
for those who learn to do well.‖ 64 After discussing other portions of the Amendment, Bingham
closed by asking not just his constituents, but the ―American people‖ to ―place in the Constitution
of the country that covenant of equal and exact justice . . . which will make the Republic
perpetual.‖ 65
Bingham was not the only Congressman to speak to the electorate about the meaning of the
Amendment. On August 28, 1866 Congressman Columbus Delano (R-Ohio) gave an extended
speech at Coshocton, Ohio.66 In a section of the news report titled ―The Amendment—Clause
First,‖ Delano noted that it defined citizenship, which ―provides that the privileges and
immunities‖ of citizens ―shall not be destroyed or impaired‖ by the states, and provided for due
process of law. 67
In explaining what this meant Delano proceeded:

I know very well that the citizens of the South and of the North going
South have not hitherto been safe in the South for want of constitutional
power in Congress to protect them. I know that white men have for a
series of years been driven out of the South, when their opinions did not
concur with the ‗chivalry‘ of the Southern slaveholders. I know that you
remember when an able lawyer from Massachusetts was expelled from
South Carolina by a Southern mob. And I know that we determined
these privileges and immunities of citizenship by this amendment of the
Constitution ought to be protected, and I know you have lost your reason,

64

The latter statement is undoubtedly, as Professor Gerald N. Magliocca has suggested, a reference to
Georgia‘s draconian statutes that applied to Missionaries to the Cherokee Indians before their removal from
Georgia. Magliocca, supra note 60, at 518. A slightly different version urged Tennessee to ratify the
fourteenth amendment and every southern state to follow suit: ―Then, hereafter, in Georgia, men shall not
be imprisoned, as in the past, for teaching the lowly to read in the New Testament of another and a better
life.‖ Id. at fn. 92. Again, one must ask, how could this be prevented without the enforcement of the Bill of
Rights against Georgia?
65
CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 63, at 19 (Bingham: Bowerstown speech).
66
CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 63, at 23. This speech was reported by a correspondent of the
Cincinnati Commercial and no doubt published originally in the Commercial. It seems probable that the
speech was re-published at least in the newspapers of Delano‘s own 13 th Congressional District. Delano
served as a Whig (1845-1847) and Republican (1865-69) in Congress and as the U.S. Secretary of the
Interior (1870-1875).
67
Delano made no mention of the equal protection clause. Id.
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every man of you, who denies the propriety of their protection. [Applause.]‖68
Delano‘s clear statement that the amendment would protect ―citizens of the South and of the
North going South‖ demonstrates that he did not view the amendment as a mere ―equality‖ or
―non-discrimination‖ provision, but rather one that provided substantive rights. Read fairly, this
speech indicates that there was to be a substantive right of free discussion for all in the South and
that mobbing and banishment was to be prevented.
General Rutherford B. Hayes, war hero,69 Congressman and future President of the United
States, made a public speech at the Cincinnati City Hall on September 7, 1866. 70 Hayes began
his speech by noting there were only two plans of reconstruction: The Union Plan, which
followed the policy of Lincoln, and the ―rebel plan.‖ 71 As Hayes outlined it, ―the Union men of
the country‖ had beliefs which included that African Americans were entitled to ―freedom, and
protection in the full enjoyment of the inalienable rights of man.‖ 72
Hayes summarized the ―rebel‖ plan as follows:
Loyal white men and loyal [Black] men are to be protected
alone in those States by State laws, executed {?} by State
authorities, as if they were loyal States. 73 { ? = same as on p. 11} I was not
able to verify this quote with the copy of Campaign Speeches I found. It did not include page 28.
Hayes insisted that such a plan was ―wrong in principle, wrong in its details, and finally wrong as
a precedent and example for the future.‖ 74 He insisted that only the constitutional amendment
could protect the loyalists of the south. Hayes said that ―no Union man‖ can object to the
Amendment because the terms are ―few in number, easily understood, and manifestly just.‖ 75
68

Id. at col. 3. The italicized emphasis was in the original. The underlined emphasis was added by the
author.
69
Hayes commanded soldiers in mostly what were considered smaller battles but did so with success. He
was wounded twice and injured a third time when his horse what shot out from under him. Though he
acceded in his nomination to Congress, he refused to leave the battlefield until the fighting was over. See
HANS L. TREFOUSSE, RUTHERFORD B. HAYES 21-38 (2002). Grant noted in his memoirs that Hayes‘
―conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry as well as the display of qualities of a higher
order than that of mere personal daring.‖ ULYSSES S. GRANT, PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U.S. GRANT 480
(2001 reprint).
70
―The Questions of the Day,‖ CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 63, at 28.
71
Id. at col. 1.
72
Id.
73
Id. (emphasis added).
74
In this regard, Congressman Hayes‘ views seem to be consistent with Madison‘s idea of ―double
security.‖ See infra note 202. This concern about the unreliability of the state is articulated by Bingham‘s
view that one reason for the need for the Fourteenth Amendment was to put the guarantee of rights into the
Constitution ―thus placing [them] above the power of South Carolina to repeal [them].‖ Curtis, supra note
27, at 925 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (Dec. 21, 1866)).
75
Id. One of the goals that Hayes indicated the Amendment was designed to achieve was to remove ―every
relic of slavery from the Federal Constitution and from the constitutions and laws of all the States.‖ Id.
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Judiciary Chair James Wilson‘s (R-Iowa) articulated the need for Fourteenth
Amendment protection of citizens in a campaign speech in September 1866:
We must still guarantee . . . the liberty of going into any part of the
United States and causing their type to speak as freely as when our
Army was there. . . . [The boys who fought the war] must have the
same liberty of speech in any part of the South as they always have
had in the North . . . .

76

These views are very similar to those of the ―call‖ for the Convention of Southern
loyalists that took place in Philadelphia which Professor Curtis has documented. 77 Curtis
indicates that the ―call‖ for the convention was circulated in writing and then again read at the
Convention when it met in September of 1866:
The majority in Congress, and its supporters, firmly
declare that ‗the rights of the citizen enumerated in the Constitution,
and established by the supreme law, must be maintained inviolate.
Rebels and Rebel sympathizers assert that ‗the right of
the citizens must be left to the States alone, and under
such regulations as the respective States choose
voluntarily to prescribe.‘ 78
According to Curtis:
the loyalists‘ Appeal of the Loyal Men of the South to Their
Fellow Citizens was widely reprinted in the Republican press.
It reflected the loyalists‘ understanding that free speech rights
were among the rights of citizens of the United States that states
must respect. It said that ‗seeds of oligarchy [were] planted in
the constitution by its slavery feature‘ and had produced
monstrous results . . . . Statute books groaned under despotic
laws against unlawful and insurrectionary assemblies aimed at the
constitutional guarantees of the right to peaceably assemble and
petition for redress of grievances; it proscribed democratic
literature as incendiary; it nullified constitutional guarantees of
76

MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 253 (1986) (citing Burlington (Iowa) Hawk Eye,
Sept. 13, 1866, at 1, col. 2). In this same speech Wilson argues that the former slaveholders should not be
compensated for the loss of slaves.
77
Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life after Death: the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States, 78 N. C. L. REV. 1071, 1134-35 (2000).
78
Id. (emphasis added).
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freedom of free speech and a free press; it deprived citizens of
the other States of their privileges and immunities in the States . . . . 79
On August 30, 1866 the North American (Pa.) responded to the question of what
constituted one‘s privileges or immunities under the amendment:
The privileges and immunities . . . are those of not having your private
letters opened and read by emissaries of the oligarchy . . . ; of not having
your political sentiments regulated by the same absolute authority; of not
being beaten, maimed, murdered or driven away from exercising freedom of
speech or the press; of holding meetings or conversations for lawful
purposes; the privilege of looking after your property in your own way;
of collecting your debts by lawful means. . . ; of organizing your political
party and voting your own ticket without intimidation or molestation.‖ 80
There were other public speeches that corroborate the nationalization of protection.
General, Congressman, and future President James A. Garfield (R-Ohio) spoke at the convention
in Toledo that re-nominated Congressman Ashley (R-Ohio) for his fifth term in Congress.
Among other matters, Garfield affirmed that the amendment would protect ―individual rights.‖ 81
Garfield indicated Congress passed the Civil Rights Act because ―the courts of the South do not
recognize these men as having any civil rights . . . .‖ 82 In rejecting President Johnson‘s claim
that ―the great law of supply and demand‖ would protect African Americans, Garfield made it
clear that the type of protection in which he, Garfield, was advocating and what would be
provided by the Fourteenth Amendment was the protection of ―personal liberty‖ and ―individual
rights.‖ 83

79

Id.
North American (Pa.) Aug. 30, 1866, at 2, col. 3 quoted in Curtis, supra note 76, at 144, who in turn
quoted from James Bond, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania,‖ 18 AKRON L. REV. 435 (1985). Professor Curtis indicates that Bond concluded that this
provision supports ―selective incorporation.‖ The fallacy of Bond‘s logic is discussed below in section
VIII.
81
This is consistent with and reinforced by knowledge of Garfield‘s speech upon the floor of Congress
where he indicated that personal rights and liberties must be ―in the keeping of the nation‖ and that rights
relating to life, liberty and property could ―no longer [be] left to the caprice of mobs or the contingencies of
local legislation.‖ Curtis, supra note 27, at 945 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,1st Sess. 1757 (April 4,
1866)) . Only by invoking federal authority, could one prevent the evils against which the amendment was
designed. Indeed, Garfield‘s position is the same as that articulated by John N. Pomeroy in 1868. See infra
notes 230-243 and accompanying text.
82
Id.
83
Id. General George W. Morgan, the unsuccessful Democratic candidate for Ohio Governor in 1865,
endorsed President Johnson‘s plan and paraphrased it as ―[l]et [the Freedman] rely on himself and his
former master for protection.‖ CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 63, at 16, col. 3 (emphasis added).
80
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In reference to Section 4, Garfield indicated that if the Democrats won control of the
government they would repudiate the federal war debt. 84 In the remaining portion of that
sentence Garfield said: ―[N]ot only so, but all that has been gained substantially in the war would
be lost. Let that party triumph this fall, and Union men can not stay any longer in the South.‖ 85
According to Garfield, the ―scenes of the New Orleans‖ massacre would be ―re-enacted in every
city of south. Our friends who were once soldiers, and who are now settled there, are already
being told to leave . . . .‖ 86
Garfield expressed regret that the audience could not hear from ―that able man who has
suffered in the South, Governor [Andrew Jackson] Hamilton‖ about whom Michael Kent Curtis
had written for so long. 87 ―[Hamilton] said that he could not live in Texas but for the great Union
party at the North . . . .‖ 88
Garfield noted that President Johnson argued that the white slaveholder had to be
admitted to Congress because the U.S. did not believe in taxation without representation, to
which Garfield replied:
Then, why do you refuse representation to four millions of [N]egroes?
Yet you and your party deny their right to representation but claim your
right to tax them to the very utmost. [Loud applause.] 89
In other ways Garfield met the racial issue head on:
I had ten thousand times rather take by the hand a [B]lack man who is loyal than the
whitest-skinned man on earth who is a traitor to my country. [Loud applause.] 90
Ashley was renominated by acclamation and the platform adopted made it clear that the
convention endorsed the Amendment. 91 The platform also made it clear that the spirit of slavery
was not dead and that new protections were necessary:
Resolved, That in the recent butchery of loyal Union citizens of the United
States, throughout the South, and especially in New Orleans, we recognize
the same old spirit of despotism, cruelty and injustice, . . . and we believe, if
these horrible massacres of peaceful and unoffending citizens, by rebels, are
84

Id.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. Professor Curtis first called our attention to Governor Hamilton in 1986. Curtis, supra note 76, at
133-134 and 137.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. Garfield stated that the Democrats ―hate‖ the Black man not because of the color of his skin, but
because he was loyal while they were disloyal.
91
Id. at col. 2.
85
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continued, that another civil war is inevitable. 92
In addition, Congressman, Senator and future Secretary of Treasury, John Sherman
(R-Ohio), stated that the nation was ―bound by every obligation . . . to protect [African
Americans] in all their natural rights.‖ 93 To this, the reporter indicated the audience responded
with ―tremendous applause.‖ 94 Sherman further indicated that Congress ―demanded protection to
every loyal man . . . .‖
Professor Thomas expressed surprise to find racist articles in Maryland,95 and in his final
paper broadens this to other northern states. 96 But it is well known that Democratic efforts in the

92

Id. (emphasis in original).
CINCINNATI COMMERCIAL, Sept. 29, 1866 at 39.
94
Id.
95
Professor Thomas quotes the vituperative language of the 1868 Democratic Platform, without much
pause over the fact that the Democrats lost that race, by over 300,000 votes, with the Republican receiving
52.7% of the popular vote. The Democrats only carried eight of the thirty-three states: Delaware, Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon. Five of the eight states were slave
states until the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865. They lost the electoral vote
overwhelmingly: 214-80. By utilizing the popular vote and ignoring the distribution that produced the
electoral vote, he concludes that the Democratic campaign ―was not a colossal failure.‖ Thomas, supra
note ___, at ___ {JCLI Draft p. 25}. But this anachronistic. The Democrats did not see it that way.
Indeed, though the Horace Greely debacle of 1872 produced the lowest percentage vote for a Democratic
candidate (43%) between 1860 –1892, WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION 71 (1979),
Seymour‘s 1868 percentage of 47% was not significantly above it. Gillette termed both the 1868 and the
1872 elections ―catastrophic.‖ Id.; see also FONER, supra note 48, at 267 (referring to the 1866
Congressional elections as ―a disastrous defeat‖). [more than one Foner source is cited at fn. 48].
93

The losses in the Congressional elections of 1866 and the Presidential election of 1868 were so devastating
that some Democrats realized if they held to that platform they would never again prevail in a national
election. This caused them to abandon their 1868 platform and announce what was termed the ―New
Departure.‖ ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1877 412 (1988) (―The advocates of a New Departure
argued that their party could only return to power by putting the issues of Civil War and Reconstruction
behind them.‖).
While there is no dispute that the Democrats who used a racist approach to campaigning existed in
all states, it should be noted that they were in the minority in four of the seven so-called ―sympathetic
border states‖ named , Thomas supra note __, at ____ {JCLI Draft p. 23.}, with Indiana, Missouri, Ohio,
and Kansas having voted Republican in the 1868 election.
This misperception about the extent of the influence of the racists within the Democratic party and the
party‘s minority status is illustrative of the context that is missing from much of the article. Without
intending to be exclusive, four more examples stand out:
1. There is a continuing reference to ―Radical Republicans‖ Thomas, supra note ___, at __ {JCLI
Draft at . 23, 25, 44, 45), as if they controlled Congress and/or wrote the Fourteenth Amendment
when, in fact, Congress and the content of the Amendment were controlled by the moderates and
not the radicals. Even the conservative New York Times considered the Amendment to be a
moderate proposal which would unite all elements of the Republican majority. FONER, supra note
__, at 260; Aynes, supra note 56, at 385-386 and sources cited therein; and Bryan Wildenthal,
Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original Understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1866–67, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 1509, 1559 (2007) (on support of Johnson‘s veto of the
Civil Rights Act).
2. Professor Thomas refers to ―[t]he South‖ having ―rejected the Fourteenth Amendment.‖
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election of 1866 included the ―most vicious race baiting in all of American History.‖ 97 They
―employed mean-spirited and vicious rhetoric to appeal to voters‘ basest prejudices and fears.‖98
Northern Democrats as well as Southern ones thought—as they had in past elections—that the
society was so racist that the Democrats would win running against African Americans. They
were wrong. They pursued that strategy and lost overwhelmingly, reversing the trend where the
majority party loses ―off-year‖ elections.99 The Nation concluded that the Republican victory was
―the most decisive and emphatic victory ever seen in American politics.‖ 100
One example of the losing Democratic approach is found in the speech of former antiwar Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham (D-Ohio). 101 A key claim of Vallandigham was that
the Civil Rights Bill could not rightly be enacted by either Congress or a state legislature and that
its ―fixed purpose‖ was to ―obliterate all distinctions on account of color and thus literally to
prepare the way for making this not a white man‘s government, but a government of [N]egroes,
or a mixed government.‖ Under the title ―The Constitutional amendment‖ Vallandigham focused
upon the citizenship clause, the privileges or immunities clause, and the enforcement clause.
The articulated concern was that, when combined, these constitutional clauses would
overcome the state constitution of Ohio, which limited the right to vote to white citizens.102

Thomas, supra note ____, at ___ {JCLI draft at 23}. Though he does not clearly state this, what
he is referring to is the Andrew Johnson all-white minority governments (replacing the loyal
Lincoln governments) which followed Johnson‘s lead in rejecting the Amendment.
As soon as the Congress organized more democratic governments that allowed the majority of
males to vote in Southern States, those more democratic governments ratified the Amendment.
In this context Thomas is defining ―South‖ to count only the former slaveholders, the prior
oligarchy, and those formerly in rebellion, Thomas excludes from the term ―southerner‖ the
over 100,000 white southern soldiers who fought for the Union Army, the over 200,000 African
Americans soldiers who fought for the Union, and many others who were loyal but did not engage
in the war. Functionally, he defines ―the South‖ as the white anti-Republican minority and
excludes all others no matter where they were born, resided or held citizenship.
3. There is no demonstration of familiarly with the anti-slavery legal theory (1834-1865) and
Republican ideology that would place some of the articles he discounts into context. In many
instances, this familiarity would change the conclusion reached about the meaning of the
newspaper articles.
4. The claim that the equal protection clause ―was probably understood‖ to mean that ―a prosecutor
could not use peremptory challenges to exclude [B]lacks from jury service,‖ Thomas, supra note
___, at ___{JCLI 30}, seems particularly anachronistic.
96
Thomas, supra note __, at 28.
97
ROBERT D. SAWREY, DUBIOUS VICTORY 4 (1992).
98
Id. at 6.
99
FONER, supra note ___, at 267. [Foner is cited more than once, each referring to different sources. I
cannot tell which Foner cite fn. 99 and 100 refer to. See fn. 48.]
100
FONER, supra note ___, at 268 (citing Nation, Nov.15, 1866).
101
CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 63, at 42 col. 2.
102
Id. Though Vallandigham does not explicitly equate voting with citizenship and, indeed, by the
discussion of Section 2 later may not be making that claim, the speech is imprecise enough that one cannot
tell whether the objection is to African American citizenship or voting or both. He does claim that the
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Claiming that the state constitutions of Indiana, Illinois, and ―nearly‖ every Northwestern state
contained provisions ―against [N]egro suffrage, against [N]egro equality,‖103 Vallandigham
argued that the enforcement clause was designed so that ―no State shall be allowed to enforce the
provisions of its own Constitutions.‖104
Immediately after the quoted section, Vallandigham quoted, verbatim, the privileges, or
immunities, clause of the Amendment and then stated this conclusion:
So, henceforward, it is not to belong to the State authorities to
determine any question that shall, in the judgment of Congress, or
the courts of the United States, abridge the immunities or privileges of
the [African American] population, not of the South only, but of the
Northwest also.105
A speaker who spoke against Congressman Delano (R-Ohio) was the unsuccessful Democratic
candidate for Governor of Ohio, General George W. Morgan. Morgan had a mixed war record,
having resigned from the Army in June 1863 because he was not viewed well by his commander,
General William T. Sherman, and because Morgan opposed the abolition of slavery.106
Morgan‘s key concern with the Amendment was that because it defined citizenship and took
away from the states the right to determine who would be citizens, it was ―another bold stride
toward a central despotism.‖ 107 Morgan concluded that if the federal government had the right to
define who were citizens, ―it would be at once claimed that [the Federal Government] also had
the right to define the rights of such citizens . . . .‖ 108 The problem with that, according to
Morgan, was ―we should soon have [N]egro jurors, voters, judges, and legislators in Ohio, by
virtue of laws of Congress.‖ 109
After quoting a portion of Section 2, Morgan indicated that ―[t]he object of the amendment,
then, is to create [N]egro judges, jurors and legislators, and, if you refuse to make [N]egros your
Amendment‘s definition of state citizenship was a violation of ―a fundamental principle of our Federal
system‖ that the state defined citizenship. Id. Of course, prior to the war the Democrats denied that the
state had the right to define state citizenship to include African Americans.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. This view would, of course, be consistent with enforcing the Bill of Rights against the states.
Keeping his focus upon race, Vallandigham proceeded to object to Section 2 which might result in AfricanAmerican voting rights. One might wonder why this speaker or any Democratic speaker would talk about
something as politically insignificant or complicated as the grand jury or the right against selfincrimination, when they thought they could win with a straightforward racist appeal?
106
STEWART SIFAKIS, WHO WAS WHO IN HE CIVIL WAR 456 (1988). He also supported McClellan against
Lincoln in the 1864 Presidential election. Id.
107
CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 63, at 16, col. 1.
108
Id.
109
Id.
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political equals, then you are to be partially disfranchised. [Applause.]‖ At that point, Morgan
invited the people in the audience who favored this to vote for Delano ―and if elected he will aid
you in placing yourselves, your wives, sons and daughters, on a level with the [N]egroes.‖110
Morgan also campaigned against ―Negro Suffrage‖ in the District of Columbia, the wool
tariff, domination (―vassalage‖) by New England,111 and, to the soldiers, claimed that ―you
languished in prison because [Secretary of War] Edwin M. Stanton thought more of the [N]egro
than he did of you . . . .‖ 112
Continuing his appeal to irrational racism, Morgan pounded Delano‘s record:
Columbus Delano voted to establish [N]egro equality at the National Capital
[by voting for suffrage]. Nor is this all. He voted for a similar bill to establish
[N]egro suffrage in the Territories [and] voted for the Civil Rights Bill, thereby
creating the right of [N]egroes to sit on juries, even in violation of the
Constitution and laws of any, or every State. 113
The core of his views was:
These men, who claim to be your leaders, assert that the [N]egro is the
equal of the white man. . . . Can you then, consistently with your own
self-respect, support the men who have sought to betray—yes, and degrade
you? [Applause.] 114
110

Id. Note the focus upon female relatives and the avoidance of any mention of male relatives.
Id. Morgan claimed Ohio was ―ruled by New England!‖ He said that Senators—he meant all members
of Congress—who were originally from New England brought those ideas to other states and included
Columbus Delano (R-Ohio), Thaddeus Stevens (R-Pa.), Benjamin Wade (R-Ohio), and Judge Trumbull (RIll.). He urged the men of Ohio to ―break the shackles which the schemers of New England have thrown
around us.‖ Id.
112
The policy of refusing to exchange prisoners of war unless the Confederate states included African
American Union Soldiers was a policy of U.S. Grant. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM,
THE CIVIL WAR ERA 793 (1988) (―No distinction whatever will be made in the exchange between white
and [Black] prisoners.‖). Morgan lacked the courage to name him because he was so popular and named
Secretary of War Stanton, instead. Of course, the real fault was with the Confederate States who refused to
treat African Americans as soldiers.
113
Id. at col. 3.
114
Id. Morgan tried to link his view to that of Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and Abraham Lincoln.
Professor Thomas takes the Democratic Platform of 1868 at its modern word when it claimed in 1868 it
wants to right to avoid ―centralization‖ and ―consolidated government.‖ Thomas, supra note ___ {JCLI at
25. }.
In summarizing the 1868 Democratic Convention a leading historian of the times says: ―[I]t was abusive in
tone, intolerant in feeling, imprudent in its reconstruction plank, contradictory in economic policy, and
impolitic in its nominations. The party thus guaranteed that it would be unsatisfactory to the moderate
conservative voter, would alienate unionist Democrats, and would antagonize Republicans.‖ WILLIAM
GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION 14 (1979). The 1866 speeches of former Congressman
Vallandigham and General Morgan show what Democrats wanted was the ―state‘s right‖ to continue to
completely control the emancipated slave and the unionist in the borders of their states. They wanted to be
able to deal with the almost 1,000 murders that General Sheridan said took place in Texas in the usual way:
111
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However, while these racist appeals may have increased the Democratic vote, they were
ultimately unsuccessful in winning the Congressional elections of 1866 or the Presidential
election of 1868.
Once the amendment was ratified in 1868, until approximately 1873, there was near
universal agreement that the Bill of Rights could be enforced against the states. We see this in
the work of Robert Kaczorowski who documents that this was the view of the prosecutors who
brought cases for violations of the enforcement statutes under the Fourteenth Amendment. 115
Indeed, as Cruikshank illustrates, we see this in the view of heroic prosecutors at least up until
1876. 116 This agreement was also shown in many of the early cases decided under the
Fourteenth Amendment in the lower Courts before 1873 and in the positions taken by various
Justices of the Supreme Court on the Circuit or in private correspondence. 117

to prosecute no one for the murder of a unionists or African American. They wanted to deal with the
African Americans by the ―Black codes‖ which made African Americans virtual slaves of the state. They
wanted to deal with the terrorist assaults upon white and Black Republicans, like those of Memphis and
New Orleans, as they had always done: give them tacit approval, refuse to protect the victims, and to refuse
to prosecute the terrorists. So the terrorists and their political allies were indignant. Why does that surprise
anyone and why do we care?
115
This was also the view of the U.S. Attorneys‘ office and key decisions of the lower federal courts.
ROBERT J. KACZOROWKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary
Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N. Y. U. L. REV. 863 (1986);
U.S. v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282 ); U.S. v. Mall, 26 F.Cas. 1147 (S.D. Ala.
1871) (No. 15,712). It is unclear whether Hall and Mall are the same case or two separate cases. See
Aynes, supra note 31, at 98 n.262.
In his decision upon the Circuit in the Slaughterhouse Cases, Justice Joseph Bradley indicated that
police regulations ―cannot [interfere with liberty of conscience, or with the entire equality of all creeds and
religions before the law. Nor can they] . . . interfere with the fundamental privileges and immunities of
American citizens.‖ Live-Stock Dealers‘ & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408). Further, in his dissent in the
Supreme Court, Bradley specifically listed trial by jury, free exercise of religious worship, free speech, free
press, the right of assembly, the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and due process as
privileges and immunities. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 118 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting);
Aynes, supra note 9, at 1257 n.397. The privileges and immunities were not limited to the Bill of Rights.
Earl Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise—Section One in the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 934, 966-67, 970 (1984).
116
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
117
See Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI-KENT L. REV. 627, 671 (1994). (quoting a letter in which Field
indicated that the amendment approved by Congress ―appears to me to be just what we needed.‖); I THE
SALMON P. CHASE PAPERS, JOURNALS, 1829-1872 (John Nevin ed., 1993) (Diary entry of Justice Chase
about his conversation with southern leaders urging them to make support of the Fourteenth Amendment
the platform for the 1866 elections; entries of Wednesday, Sept. 5, 1866 at 632 and Monday, Sept. 24, 1866
at 640).
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In addition, this was the unanimous view of the only three legal treatises published between
1866 and 1868 which also commented upon the effect of the pending amendment. 118 In addition,

118

JUDGE TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1867);
JUDGE GEORGE W. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES DEFINED AND CAREFULLY
ANNOTATED (1868); DEAN JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES (1868).
For an analysis of the text of these works and the status of their authors, see Aynes, supra note 31, at 83-94.
There were at least four other treatises published in 1867 or 1868 which did not acknowledge the pending
amendment or comment upon its effect if adopted. Those treatises were WILLIAM WEDGEWOOD, THE
GOVERNMENT AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES(1867); GEORGE COMSTOCK, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW BY JAMES KENT (11th ed. 1867); WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, A COURSE OF LECTURES
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1868); and THOMAS M. COOLEY,
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868).
Professor Wildenthal and Professor Dripps would add an examination of treatises by JOEL E. BISHOP,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1866) and FRANCIS WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (1868). When I first started
examining treatises, I was focused upon those that addressed Constitutional Law and would not have
looked either of these treatises. That is not a reason to disqualify them, simply an explanation of my own
past research. We can examine treatises in the ratification period for multiple purposes, but I will have to
defer that pleasure to the future.
There is some dispute over the importance of Cooley in determining the meaning of the amendment.
Professor Wildenthal agrees with my conclusion that Cooley‘s 1868 treatise did not mention the Fourteenth
Amendment and that therefore it cannot help us in knowing what, if any, contemporaneous opinions
Cooley may have had about the adoption of the amendment or its goals. He does suggest that I have misread Cooley‘s 1871 treatise. Wildenthal, supra note 4, at {Pre. Conference draft at 20 }. I will try to
return to this point in the future. But for now I would suggest that given the need to look at
contemporaneous (pre-ratification) statements the only reason to look at the 1871 treatise is because
Charles Fairman cited it (along with the 1868 and 1873 treatises) for the ―want of knowledge‖ of
incorporation by Cooley. CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890
116 (1939). Though I may not have articulated this clearly in 1993, sixteen years later it appears to me
that an examination of the 1871 treatise is important for two reasons. First, it helps test Fairman‘s
scholarship. Second, if, as I think is the case, Cooley‘s 1871 has some ambiguity in it, it helps to
understand that he went from silence in 1868 to ambiguity in 1871 to clarity in 1873.
In addition to reading his article, Professor Rosenthal and I have exchanged some views about the
importance of Cooley over the last year. Where it appears we disagree, is on the time in which Cooley‘s
views would be relevant for determining the intent, meaning, or public understanding of the Amendment.
Though I may well return to this issue for a fuller discussion at some time in the future, for now, my views
and questions are:
1. The relevant time for Cooley to express his views on the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment
generally ends with its adoption in July 1868. As far as I can tell, Cooley expressed no
opinion prior to that time.
2. Do we know, from any source, what Cooley‘s personal view was on whether the Amendment
should be adopted or not? Did he support the adoption of the amendment like Chief Justice
Salmon P. Chase and Justice Stephen Field? Did he endorse the anti-fourteenth amendment
sponsored by President Johnson like Justice Miller? Or did he stay silent in 1866-1867?
3. Cooley was a Republican when elected to the Michigan Supreme Court in 1864. By 1887 he had
become a Democrat. When did he abandon the Republican party and why?
4. At some point Cooley became a person with a national reputation within the legal profession.
Based upon some preliminary research, my own hypothesis is that Cooley was not well known in
1866-1868 and that he attained the national reputation attributed to him only in the 1880s. Is
there any evidence to the contrary?
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at least by the early 1870s, the application of the Bill of Rights to the state was accepted by the
Democrats.119
III.
The need for contemporaneous statements on understanding/intent: Pre-1866-1868
The relevant period of inquiry is primarily the events leading up to the proposal of the
amendment (the relevant history and the evils against which it was thought to cure), and the
public debates both before and during ratification. With rare exception, post-ratification
statements are of little or no weight and Professor Wildenthal has outlined some of the reasons
that post-ratification events are to be taken with some caution. Those cautions apply with much
stronger force to the Fourteenth Amendment because of the ―reactionary‖ movement that took
place after the adoption of the amendment. The analysis below explains some of the reasons for
the significant changes in public opinion and how those changes should be taken into account.
A.
Changes wrought by politics and economics
A detailed examination of the Reconstruction era is beyond the scope of this article, but
everyone who has studied the period recognizes that a profound change took place. 120 We know
that we can document changes in leading political leaders, and indeed, the country, as early as
1871. 121 Indeed, by September of 1871 Horace Greeley, one of the national leaders of the
Republican Party, was publicly opposed to the re-nomination of Ulysses S. Grant as President.
Then in May of 1872, Greeley accepted the nomination of the Liberal Republicans and the
Democrats for President. 122 Among the noted Republicans deserting their Party and joining with
their former enemies was Charles Sumner (R- Mass.)123 and Lyman Trumbull (R-Ill.).124 Further,

The above discussion upon treatises is also applicable to the comments Professor Dripps made on treatises.
See Dripps, supra note ___, at ___ {Draft – pages are not numbered}.
119
See Bryan Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Scholarship and Commentary on the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1867–73, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES___ (2009).
120
An analogous shift in public opinion may be comparing the attitudes toward slavery after the Revolution
with those of the more repressive 1830s, or attitudes of the 1960s with those of the 1990s.
121
See generally HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION, RACE, LABOR, AND
POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865-1901, 93 and 101 (2001). Others in the list included
prominent Republican and former Union General Carl Schurz who had campaigned for both John Fremont
and Abraham Lincoln; Murat Halstead of the Cincinnati Commercial; Horace White of the Chicago
Tribune; William Cullen Bryan of the New York Evening Post; and Edwin L. Godkin of the Nation. Id. at
243 and 102.
122
Id.
123
RICHARDSON, supra note 121 at 103.
124
Lyman Trumbull, http://www.encyclopedida.com/doc/1E1-TrumbullL.html (last visited Mar 10, 2009).
Trumbull was one of the counsel for Democratic candidate Tilden in the contested 1876 Presidential
election.
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by 1872 the Republican Party had ―a transformed identity.‖ 125 According to Gillette, ―[w]artime
idealism was beginning to wear thin, especially as the old ranks of Republican leaders and
supporters were being decimated by death. New issues demanded attention.‖ 126
Though Grant won re-election, there were long-term consequences. The dissidents
―popularized the idea that most freemen were determined to rise without work, and legitimated in
Republican thought the Democratic idea that [B]lack voting inherently threatened to corrupt the
government.‖ 127 Then in December of 1872, with the impeachment of Louisiana Republican
Governor William Kellogg, Lieutenant Governor P. B. S. Pinchback, a prominent African
American Republican, became Governor. 128 The mere fact that a Black leader was Governor
―confirmed the worst fears of [many] anxious Northerners.‖ 129
The Colfax Massacre—―the bloodiest single‖ incident in the Reconstruction era that
included execution style killings of individuals who had surrendered—was a ―horrific white
massacre of African-Americans.‖130 Yet, the press described it as white action ―taken in selfdefense against pillaging ex-slaves‖ who were ―disaffected workers‖ who were ―trying to
control‖ the local government. 131 By the end of 1873 the Boston Evening Transcript claimed that
―the divisional lines of the Republican and Democratic parties are now . . . indistinct.‖ 132
These major political shifts were magnified by an international recession that began with
the crash of the Vienna (Austria) Stock Exchange on May 9, 1873.133 In the United States, the
week of September 13, 1873 saw the suspension of payments by several banking firms. 134 The
bankruptcy of financier Jay Cooke on September 18, 1873, ushered in what is commonly known
as the Panic of 1873. By Saturday, September 20th, ―a full-fledged panic . . . developed‖ and the
New York Stock exchanged closed for ten days. 135
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GILLETTE, supra note 95, at 52.
Id.
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Richard L. Aynes, Book Review, 65 AM. J. OF LEGAL HISTORY 98-99 (2001).
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In the midst of our own contemporary economic problems, it is sobering to realize that this
severe Depression—known as ―the long Depression‖ —lasted for at least five years until 1878. 136
This recession was ―especially significant‖ because the nation was ―still recovering from the
effects of civil war and in the process of building a great industrial and urban superstructure upon
an agrarian foundation. Both the foundation and the superstructure were shaken by [the]
depression . . . .‖ 137
With the exception of agriculture, the railroad industry was the largest employer in the nation
and the Depression caused not only bank failures but the bankruptcy of more than a fourth of the
nation‘s railroads. The index of stock prices for railroads declined by almost 60%. 138 Bank
clearings between 1873 and 1878 fell by 32%—second only to the 55% decline during the 20th
Century Depression between 1929 and 1932. 139 Commodity prices are estimated to have fallen
30%. 140 Similarly, retail prices, which had already gone down after the Civil War, were
estimated to have declined by approximately 20% between 1873 and 1877. 141 Yearly
bankruptcies increased by almost 100% between 1873 and 1878. 142
Though most of the data available relates to urban dwellers, the nation was still
overwhelmingly rural. 143 But the effect upon rural people was shown by the fact that while the
estimated decline in prices was 1.7% a year, the wholesale prices for agricultural and other
commodities ―fell at a greater rate‖ and were estimated to have declined by 3.0% per year by one
source. 144 The effect was even greater than one might suspect, because ―farmers are generally
net monetary debtors and, as such, are harmed by a fall in prices, which raises the real value of
their debt . . . .‖ 145
Other businesses failed, and it is reported that in 1876 national unemployment was 14
146

percent.

American history—and perhaps world history—has repeatedly shown that when

people fear they cannot feed their families, they will demand a change. Meetings and protests
136

Id. at 495. There are suggestions that after a brief upturn in 1879-1880, the recession ―even extended
into the 1880‘s . . . .‖ Id.
137
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 405-06.
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Id. at 496.
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Id. at 496-97.
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According to on-line records of the U.S. Census, in 1860 80.2% of the population lived in a rural area
and in 1870 the percentage was 74.3%. http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/files/table4.pdf.
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Milton Friedman, The Crime of 1873, 98 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1159, 1171 (1990).
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Id.
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In New York City it was estimated that one-third of the workers were unemployed in 1873-74 and that
other eastern cities experienced like amounts of joblessness. Rezneck, supra note 133, at 498.
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took place across the nation. One of these in New York City, known as the Tompkins Square
Riot, caused ―great alarm‖ and led to a report that it was caused by ―well-known Communists,
Internationalism, and Free-thinkers, with a sprinkling of sympathizing natives.‖ 147
Congressional hearings were held on the condition of the economy in 1878 and 1879.148
Because the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 aggravated the crisis by allowing a single creditor to force a
debtor into bankruptcy, President Grant recommended its repeal. 149 The Supreme Court itself
helped aggravate the problem by declaring as unconstitutional the ―familiar stay laws for the
protection of debtors‘ assets‖ that had been used in such depression before. 150
The question of using paper money and backing it with gold and/or silver resulted in a
―bitter controversy‖ during the depression.151 There is debate among economists whether the
U.S. Coinage Act of 1873152 ultimately helped or hurt the economy,153 but the data seems to
confirm that one of its results was to bring about deflation which, in the short run, aggravated the
depression of 1873-1878.154 According to economist Milton Friedman, ―[f]or the next twentyseven years the silver question bedeviled the politics and the finances of the United States.‖ 155
It was during these times that new—and often radical—ideas were advanced. As one
might expect, the depression caused a refocus of political efforts and political realignments based
upon economic issues. In 1876 the National Greenback Labor Party was formed and in 1878 it
not only polled over one million votes but also won fourteen seats in Congress.156 The Knights of
Labor, previously a local organization in Philadelphia, held its first ―General Assembly‖ in
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Id. This is taken from the New York Society for the Improvement of the Condition of the Poor report.
One historian has stated that the Panic of 1873 ―hurt small farmers and small towns profoundly; prosperity
would be found hereafter in larger towns with far more diversified economies.‖ LORLE PORTER, A PEOPLE
SET APART: SCOTCH-IRISH IN EASTERN OHIO 830 (1998).
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Friedman, supra note 144, at 502. [ I don‘t believe this is the right page number because the article starts
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Id. at 505. Congress amended the act to require the agreement of one-fourth of the creditors
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Id. at 505. Edwards v. Kearzey, 95 U.S. 595 (1878) (infringement of contracts contrary to Art. I,
Section 10). Justice Harlan dissented without opinion. Id.
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Id. at 504; see also Milton Friedman, The Crime of 1873, 98 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1159
(1990).
152
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See Friedman, supra note 144 (noting that the consensus is that it helped the economy, though arguing
that this was actually ―a mistake that had highly adverse consequences.‖).
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Though there had been ―sharper‖ deflation after the Civil War, the rate of deflation in the U.S. between
1875 and 1896 has been estimated at 1.7% per year. Friedman, supra note 144, at 1170.
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Id. at 1167.
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Id. at 508. Friedman attributes the deflationary trend to the creation of this party. Friedman, supra note
144, at 1170.
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Reading, Pennsylvania in 1878. 157 In 1876 a Philadelphia Congress founded a ―Workingmen‘s
Party‖ which, in 1877, became the Socialist Labor Party. 158
These political developments were exacerbated by strikes and violence:
The combination of depression, labor unrest, and socialistic
agitation provided a lurid setting of the great railroad strike in July,
1877, which stirred up passions and created an unprecedented
panic of public opinion.‖ 159
As a result:
The labor disturbances of 1877 … constituted the climatic event of
the depression and precipitated a violent burst of alarm and
threat that reflected a growing fear of class conflict and the ‗red
specter of communism.‘‖ 160
With the help of the political re-alignment and, especially, the depression, the Democrats
captured the House of Representatives in 1874.161 They won the popular vote and almost
captured the presidency in 1876. It is therefore, perhaps, not surprising that support for the
Fourteenth Amendment no longer remained the focus of most peoples‘ concern and indeed,
probably was at low ebb.
B.
Confirmation: Post-Slaughter-House Literature (1873-1949)
The political and economic changes that occurred in the early 1870s are reflected in the
literature that post-dated the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Miller wrote about
the ―pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of the war‖, but concluded that ―our statesmen
have still believed [in] the existence of the States . . . . 162 Further, he claimed that the Court
ignored the ―fluctuations‖ of ―public opinion.‖ 163 Yet, others provided a different account, and
in his private writings Miller seemed to have just the opposite attitude of what he stated
publicly.164 Though a more comprehensive account has previously been published, 165 in this
157
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Aynes, supra note 117, at 553-665 (quoting letters from Miller and assessments by Fairman about
Miller‘s low opinion of Congress and his view that Congress was ―bent on wrecking‖ an independent
Judiciary and Executive). Of course, Miller also opposed the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 660.
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section three examples will illustrate the views of those who celebrated the failure to properly
interpret the Amendment.
Congressman Samuel Shellabarger (R-Ohio) was considered a key ―Radical
theoretician.‖ 166 Yet as early as 1871 Shellabarger did not ―want the full idea of the Fourteenth
Amendment interpreted by the old rules of construction.‖ 167 In 1888, at the memorial services
for Chief Justice Waite, Shellabarger acknowledged that Cruikshank was contrary to the intent of
the Fourteenth amendment.168 But Shellabarger concluded that Waite would be well thought of
by history because ―the lapse of years had matured men‘s views and cooled their feeling
regarding the results of the late war.‖169
Similarly, University of Missouri Law Professor Christopher G. Tiedman indicated that
the Court in the Slaughter-House Cases had worked ―a successful modification of the rule found
in the fourteenth amendment.‖170 He thought this was justified because the Court was keeping
the ―amendment within the limits which [the majority of the court] felt assured would have been
imposed by the people, if their judgment has not been blinded with passion, and which in their
cooler moments they would ratify.‖ 171 According to Tiedman:
Feeling assured that the people in their cooler moments would not
have sanctioned the far-reaching effects of their action; that they
lost sight of the general effect in their eager pursue of a special end,
the court dared to withstand the popular will as expressed in the
letter of this amendment . . . . 172
The third selected example is from the American Law Review:
Never was the court truer to itself, and truer to the constitution,
than when it passed upon the momentous question involved in the
Slaughter-House Cases. A literal interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment would have destroyed local self-government, reduced the
165
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States to the condition of mere provinces, and swept away that Federal
fabric which our fathers had builded [sic] with such painful and loving care.
That such a result was contemplated by the political leaders who secured
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment is certain. But the high
patriotism of the Supreme Court led it to construe this amendment in
accordance with the traditions and true spirit of our constitution, and to
preserve to our people the inestimable advantages of local selfgovernment.173
These views help reinforce the reasons why one must look to the period before ratification to
determine the public understanding of the Amendment.
Guidance from the 19th and 21st Amendments
What is the appropriate C.
response when public attitudes make major changes such as occurred between 1868 and the
1870s? The answer is found in example of the Eighteenth Amendment enacting prohibition
which was declared ratified on January 29, 1919.174 Ultimately, it was ratified by forty-five of
the then forty-eight states.
The transformation of public opinion on prohibition illustrates the process in which one
should be engaged when vast shifts of opinion occur after the ratification of a Constitutional
Amendment. One has to ask oneself, what was the status of the Eighteenth Amendment while
ratification of the 21st Amendment was pending and it appeared to be evident that the public had
repudiated that Amendment, but before it was actually repealed? No one would argue that the
change in public support meant that the Eighteenth Amendment was no longer in effect. No one
would advise clients that the statutes prohibiting the manufacture and transportation of alcohol
adopted pursuant to the Eighteenth Amendment were no longer enforceable prior to its formal
repeal. No one would expect to successfully defend one‘s clients against criminal charges in the
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Federal Courts based on the shift in public opinion with respect to the Eighteenth Amendment
prior to its repeal.
What was the legal status of the Eighteenth Amendment while the Twenty-first
Amendment was pending and appeared to be likely to be adopted? This example parallels—but
only to a point—what has happened with the Fourteenth Amendment. The Republicans had won
―the super majority‖ in the 1866 elections and the Fourteenth Amendment was viewed as a
moderate response to the intransigence of the defeated Confederates and the terrorists who were
committing violence against African-Americans and Unionists. But, what frequently goes
unrecognized is that there was a shift in public sentiment which assuredly took place as early as
1871 and continued well into the 1880s. Even the time spans are relatively the same. It was
roughly fifteen years from the proposal of the Eighteenth Amendment until its repeal, which was
completed on December 5, 1933. It was somewhere between seven and thirteen years between
the proposal and the Fourteenth Amendment and the demise of public support for the
enforcement of that Amendment.
It is important to note that trying to judge the intentions or public understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 by actions and statements the people took after 1871 (or 1879) is
as inappropriate as trying to judge people‘s feelings about the Eighteenth Amendment‘s original
intention by their action in passing the Twenty-First Amendment or visa versa. What is different,
and I submit of Constitutional significance, is that the Eighteenth Amendment was formally
repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment while certain provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
were nullified and are currently sought to be kept in a suspended state today based on the actions
of judges and policy reasons without any formal amendment process.
V.
Round-up the usual suspects: Slaughter-House, Cruikshank,
Hurtado, and Twining
Since I first wrote about Slaughter-House175 in 1994, 176 much work has been done in the field of
applying the Bill of Rights to the states, and also upon the pre-Adamson cases of the U.S.
Supreme Court. 177
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Scholars sometimes write loosely about Slaughter-House as a case in which the central
issue was the inability of the local butchers to pursue a lawful trade or the creation of a monopoly
of that trade. This might be a fair reading of the inferences one could draw from Justice Field‘s
dissent. But a close reading of the facts of the case and Justice Miller‘s opinion indicates that the
issue was much narrower than that. All were free to pursue the occupation of a butcher and the
monopoly related not to the profession, but rather to the location of the place in which the
butchering could take place. 178
Indeed, the state‘s interest in sanitation was great and the ultimate decision was one which
Justice Hunt had previously decided in his role as a Justice of the New York Court of Appeals in
Metropolitan Board of Health v. Heister in 1868.179 This was also a health issue that Justice
Miller knew about as a citizen and former physician with health concerns based on his experience
with the stockyards in Iowa. 180 Had the opinions been limited to those issues, there would be
little or no controversy about the case.
Two important books have come to the forefront since 2000 that reinforce these views.
Professors Ronald M. Labbe and Jonathan Laurie, in The Slaughterhouse Cases: Regulation,
Reconstruction, and the Fourteenth Amendment,181 explore the health and sanitation issues in
detail and provide the documentation for one‘s instinct that there was overwhelming justification
for the Court‘s ultimate conclusion to sustain the legislation as an appropriate health measure.
Michael A. Ross‘ 2003 biography of Justice Miller182 is a welcomed improvement to Charles
Fairman‘s 1939 biography.183 Professor Ross‘ work compliments the work of Laurie and Labbte
on the propriety of the health regulations. Further, Ross provides insight to critical matters that
had not heretofore come to light. 184
The problem with the majority opinion in Slaughter-House is, as it has always been, with its
dicta. Courts and scholars have read that dicta to preclude a number of reasonable interpretations
178
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the
states.185 Numerous scholars have traced the virtual elimination of the privilege or immunities
clause back to the dicta of this decision and this appears to be the view of the overwhelming
number of scholars who have examined the case.186
In the last twenty-five years a minority view has risen that argues that the Slaughter-House
Cases actually recognized that the Bill of Rights would apply to the states. The basis for this has
been Justice Miller‘s quotation of some language from the First Amendment (without referencing
the amendment) right of assembly and petition,187 which led some to conclude that this was one
of the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizenship. 188 I remain skeptical of these approaches for
reasons I have already articulated. 189 We may care deeply about these questions as scholars and
historians, but for lawyers and would be litigators, it hardly matters. Virtually everyone agrees
that the Court took a wrong turn somewhere. The key issue is not when that took place, but what
does one do about it.
Dicta is dicta. Justice Miller‘s opinion itself identified the fact that a portion of the opinion
is dicta. Justice Miller‘s opinion talks about being ―excused from defining the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States . . . until some case . . . may make it necessary to do
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If Justice Miller intended to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states, then how does one explain his
failure to join Justice Harland‘s dissent in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)? It seems that one
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so.‖ 190 He then, instead of ending the opinion, went on to give some examples. 191 It is true that
Miller‘s dicta—whether correctly or incorrectly interpreted—has been relied upon by later courts
even within the last year. 192 Yet, it seems to me that we ought to follow the lead of the Lincoln
Republicans who treated Dred Scott as only binding for the case between the parties and ignored
what they considered dicta in the case. 193
As scholars and legal historians, it is perfectly appropriate that we continue to analyze and
debate the meaning and effect of Justice Miller‘s opinion in Slaughter-House. As matters of
public policy in the national arena for purposes of litigation or legislation, I would suggest that
we need to emulate the approach of President Lincoln and the Republicans: note the SlaughterHouse dicta for what is (dicta) and move on to find a proper interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
United States v. Cruikshank 194 has become a matter of interest in the last few years and at
least three books have been published on the Colfax Massacre that underlies that case. 195 Given
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Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1873). Similarly, in a discussion about the new articles of
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* Congress‘s definition of citizenship in the 1866 Civil Rights Act;
* The action of Congress, signed by President Lincoln , abolishing slavery in the territories; and
* The action of Congress, signed by President Lincoln, abolishing slavery in the District of
Columbia.
The seating of Senator Hiram Revels (R-Miss.) in the U.S. Senate even though if Dred Scott had
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the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in Heller v. District of Columbia,196 Cruickshank will be the
likely subject of some future Supreme Court consideration of the question of whether Heller
should be extended to apply to the states. If Heller is extended to the states, it is probable that
Cruikshank will be overruled. 197
In contrast to Slaughter-House and Cruikshank, Hurtado v. California 198 and Twining v.
New Jersey199 have not received significant scholarly attention. Hurtado is of interest today
because of Justice Harlan‘s dissent and because of the failure of Justice Miller to join Harlan‘s
dissent.
Twining, in spite of the dissent of the then aged Harlan, 75 years old at the time, was
decided without the knowledge—let alone the fervor—of reconstruction. Justice Moody, who
wrote the majority opinion, was only fifteen years old when the Fourteenth Amendment
adopted.200
One of the critical mistakes, illustrated by Cruikshank and by the Slaughter-House dicta, is the
idea that rights protected by the state could not also be protected by the federal government. As
set forth above, the states had already proven time and time again they could not be trusted to
provide even basic rights, let alone those rights to which Unionists believed all citizens were
entitled. 201 When James Madison originally proposed an amendment that would have enforced a
limited set of rights against the states, he said that it did not matter if these rights were already
protected by a state constitution because it would provide ―double security.‖ 202 This was the
same concept the Unionists were pursuing in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment.
But the citizenship clause indicates a change: that instead of national citizenship being
derivative from state citizenship, and state citizenship being primary, the framers made national
citizenship primary. 203 To use a common example, the ―problem‖ was not with the lack of
196
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existence of a right like ―free speech‖ in the southern states. It was guaranteed by their
constitutions, their statutes, and their case law. The problem was, like the problem with the antisslavery theory of the enforcement of Article IV, in the ―enforcement‖ of that right. Though other
examples exist, the disputes over free speech were so strong and so far ranging that they offer a
good illustration. The debates over free speech at both the national and state level were spirited,
public debates in which no citizen interested in the future of the nation between 1830 and 1868
could have been ignorant.
They included disputes about the meaning and interpretation of the national protections like
the right of petition under the ―gag rule‖ in which millions of signatures were gathered in a
nationwide campaign eventually lead by former President and Representative John Q. Adams.
They included the controversy over the actions of President Jackson‘s Postmaster General in
―seizing‖ anti-slavery literature from the mail. 204 They also included resistance against the
Fugitive Slave laws, and especially the Act of 1850, because of its lack of jury trial and other due
process procedures to protect free African Americans from being kidnapped and sent to slavery
when, in fact, they were free people.205 But that struggle also included many state and local
attempts to suppress free speech and even to suppress the Republican Party itself.
Prior portions of this paper have used free speech issues as an example of the evil against
which the Amendment was directed.206 A modern analysis of the free speech issues is set forth in
Michael Kent Curtis‘s Free Speech, ‗The People‘s Darling Privilege:‘ Struggles for Freedom of
Expression in American History.207 Republicans, who had grown from a minority to a majority
party controlling state and national governments, attributed this growth to free speech and
citizenship.‖ Wilson R. Huhn, The Legacy of Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank in Constitutional
Interpretation, 42 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). In speaking of the Slaughter-House Cases
Professor Huhn concluded: ―The majority of the Court turned that unmistakable hierarchy on its head, and
as a result they consigned the fundamental freedoms that Americans rightfully regard as their birthright to
the dubious protection of the States.‖ Id. Further, Professor Huhn concluded that ―[i]n placing state
citizenship over national citizenship the Slaughterhouse Court reflected the view of John C. Calhoun. Id.
In 1833 Calhoun had equated the idea of citizens of the United States to ―a citizen of the world . . . a perfect
nondescript‖ and stated that our rights depend upon being citizens of a State or territory.‖ Id. See also the
Supreme Court‘s indication that after the Fourteenth Amendment national citizenship was ―paramount and
dominant instead of being subordinate and derivative . . . .‖ Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 389
(1918).
204
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fervently believed that it was necessary for the future safety of the country. In other words, this
was a ―national security issue.‖ 208
This can be examined in the issues of Harper's Weekly. In 1865 Harper‘s Weekly claimed to
have had a circulation of more than 100,000 per week. 209 It was called by a rival, ―one of the
most powerful organs of public opinion.‖ 210
On July 20, 1861 Harper‘s stated that the government was protecting the ―rights of man‖ and
―[i]ts army, therefore, marches to defend those rights, and among others that of free speech.‖ 211
Further, Harper‘s declared that ―[t]he right of the freest speech and of petition are the birth-right
of every American citizen.‖212 In speaking of the newspapers of the rebellious states and their
attempt to ―annihilate[e] free speech,‖ Harper‘s concluded with a statement about federal
enforcement: ―They will be protected in the exercise of that right [free speech] by the same
Government of all the people, which will frustrate the end they [rebels] seek.‖ 213
In its August 17, 1861 issue, Harper‘s Weekly stated that the majority of Americans ―after
conquering this rebellion, means to have guarantees for its rights.‖ Harper‘s continued: ―Those
rights are the constitutional privilege of every American citizen; his right to go freely everywhere
in the country; and of freely expressing his opinion.‖ 214
On the same page of the same issue, the editors printed an item with the title ―Good
Citizenship‖ in which they indicated that the Union was waging a war for ―free popular
institutions‖ that were based upon the ―rights of men‖ and that ―the most absolute freedom of
discussion is one of the chief of those rights.‖ The effect of the protection of these rights was
predicted to result in the ―reconstruction of the entire frame-work of Southern society.‖ 215 One
might ponder how freedom of speech could be protected and the white, slaveholding society
reconstructed without some mechanism for national enforcement of free speech and other rights.
That there was to be a change is seen as the assertion that though the rebellion of ―Jeff Davis .
. . does not destroy the Union, it does destroy the old despotism which nullified the Constitution
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and used the Union as-it-was for its tool.‖ 216 Still later in the war, in 1864, a Harper‘s editorial
summarized the theory that it was important—to avoid a future war— that there be free speech217:
It was the knowledge that, if the right of free speech, guaranteed by the
Constitution, were tolerated in the South, slavery would be destroyed by the
common-sense of the Southern people, which made Calhoun and all his school
insist upon suppressing it. Consequently, in its most important provision,
the Constitution has been a dead letter in every slave State for more than
thirty years.218
Similarly, Harper‘s editorialized that:
The slave-drivers and their political allies at the North knew equally well that
if the constitutional right of discussion were allowed, the horrors of the system
would be known, and the outraged decency and humanity of the American
people would sweep away the inquiry in a flood of wrath.219
The Republicans believed that had free speech been allowed to flourish, slavery would
have been abolished and the war averted. For example, noting that a Democratic Judge has
charged a Grand Jury that ―the right of free discussion is a cardinal condition of a republic, ‖
Harper‘s stated that this charge ―contains several wholesome truths which, had they not been
216
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hitherto uniformly despised and outraged by the political allies of the Judge, would have saved us
from the war.‖ 220
In a June 6, 1863 column Harper‘s Weekly noted that anti-war Democrats had held a
mass meeting calling for ―free speech and personal rights‖ even though they have and want to
continue to deny these rights to others. 221 The implications of this for the future were made clear
in a column on August 6, 1864:
The people of the United States, therefore, in their Constitution have forbidden
Congress to abridge either of these rights [freedom of press and freedom of speech];
and what they would not suffer their supreme legislature to do, they will not permit to
to any local assembly. 222
The stakes on this issue were very high because according to Harper‘s, ―[w]ithout freedom of
speech and of the press a free popular government is impossible.‖ 223 Speaking of the Union
Army as ―an immense mass meeting,‖ Harper‘s assured the anti-war Democrats that this
―meeting‖ was ―in perpetual session‖ and would not adjourn until:
the flag of the United States shall secure the undisputed exercise
of every constitutional right upon every inch of the United States soil;
until Mr. Wendell Phillips shall be protected in his freedom of saying
in Charleston that slavery is a blunder and a crime, precisely as Mr.
Fernando Wood is protected in New York in saying that the colored
race is a servile people and ought to be enslaved; and until the
personal rights of man . . . are fully recognized in Georgia as they are in
Maine. 224
Nor was this just a passing theme. Rather, free speech was a continuing source of
comment during the war years. 225 Further, these concerns were not limited to free speech and
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press—even though those rights are often said to be the source of the protection of all rights—but
included others rights such as prohibition of illegal seizures, legal process before imprisonment,
the right to test disputed issues in court, and the right to be protected from mobs. 226
This theme was developed by Justice Bradley after the war. In his dissent in the
Slaughter-House Cases, he wrote that the ―mischief to be remedied‖ was not only slavery, but
―that intolerance of free speech and free discussion which often rendered life and property
insecure . . . . 227 The goal of the Fourteenth Amendment was to create conditions under which
―American citizenship should be a sure guarantee of safety, and in which every citizen of the
United States might stand erect on every portion of its soil, in the full enjoyment of every right
and privilege belonging to a freeman, without fear of violence or molestation.‖ 228
No one doubts that a proslavery person like slave-trader Nathan B. Forrest or a secessionist
like Jefferson Davis was able to speak his mind in the south. But that right of free expression did
not extend to those of opposite views, and this lack of enforcement was the problem. 229 Indeed,
given the free speech problems the nation had experienced, Congress and the people knew first
hand that they could not trust the state governments to enforce the right. If it was to be
guaranteed, it had to be able to be enforced by the federal government.
In a treatise published in 1868, while the Fourteenth Amendment was pending, but had
not yet been adopted, John Norton Pomeroy, Dean of the Law School and Chair of Political
Science at New York University, illustrated the problem with the right of protection by the ―due
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process‖ clause which existed in both the state constitutions and the federal construction. 230
Because of Barron, Pomeroy noted:
But in a case arising under the clause in a state constitution which
forbids a person to be deprive of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, the Supreme Court of the United States cannot
pass directly and independently upon the question whether a given
state statute, or a given act done under the authority of the state,
is opposed to this clause, but must defer to, and be controlled by,
the judgments of the courts of the same commonwealth which have
settled the construction given their own organic law. 231
Though the import of Pomeroy‘s thinking is relatively clear from the above reference to the due
process clause and related state provisions, he left nothing to chance and explicitly stated:
Here is plainly a vast field open for injustice and oppression by
individual states, which the nation has now no means of preventing. 232
In light of this situation, Pomeroy proposed two hypotheticals (―let it be supposed . . .‖233). The
hypotheticals involved state constitutional clauses ―securing to the people the right of keeping
and bearing arms‖ and also protection under a state due process clause.234 Thus, while the people
reading this would be only concerned with the actual rights (keeping and bearing arms and due
process), the lawyers would be aware he was talking of state analogs to the Second and Fifth
Amendments. The ―hypothetical‖ continues with the legislature passing two types of statutes.235
One requires ―certain classes of inhabitants—say [N]egroes‖ to ―surrender their arms‖ and
230
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in question are undoubtedly drawn from real actions taken by the white elite who controlled the Johnson
state governments.
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forbids them ―to keep and bear them under certain penalties . . . .‖ 236 A second statute would
require the same class to ―be hired out and to labor in a certain prescribed manner‖ or be
―declared vagrants, and liable to be seized, and by a summary proceeding bound out to service for
a term of years.‖ 237
Pomeroy then hypothesized an ―individual of the class‖ suffering some or all of the
penalties and the individual ―insists that the statutes in question are opposed to the Bill of Rights
in the state constitution. . . .‖

238

Pomeroy next assumed that the ―local courts settle the law

against him‖ and hold the statutes complied with the state constitution, leaving the national courts
bound by the decisions of the ―local judiciary.‖ 239
Pomeroy found this ―result‖ to be ―dismaying, that a ―remedy is needed‖, that one is ―easy and
the question of its adoption is now pending before the people,‖ and then referred to section one of
the Fourteenth Amendment by name.240
Given the use of the term ―class‖ and what looks to us like class-based discrimination, one
might mistakenly believe that Pomeroy was talking about an equal protection violation. But in
setting up his hypothetical, Pomeroy did not write about a state equal protection clause, only the
state constitutional provisions of the right to bear arms and due process. Also his hypothetical on
surrendering one‘s arms is coupled with the right to bear arms, and the labor regulations/summary
proceeding issue is coupled with the due process clause. Thus, there is no reason to believe
Pomeroy was making an equal protection claim and every reason to believe that he was writing
about the Fourteenth Amendment preventing the violation of the right to bear arms and due
process.
In writing about the abuses that could occur with state courts enforcing only state created
rights, Pomeroy wrote of this as a ―vast field open for injustice and oppression by individual
states, which the nation has now no means of preventing.‖ 241 Then on the very next page,
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Id. at 150.
Id.
238
Id. (emphasis added).
239
Id. at 151.
240
Id. at 149, 151. In talking about the ―rule of interpretation‖ of Barron v. Baltimore, Pomeroy indicated
that while it is ―firmly established‖ that ―the rule itself is certainly an unfortunate one. The United States,
as the sovereign, as supreme over all state governments, should be able to afford complete protection to its
citizens. It is not enough that this protection should be extended to citizens while abroad; it should be as
power at home. The citizen should be guarded in the enjoyment of his civil rights of life, liberty, limb, and
property, against the unequal and oppressive legislation of the states. The Rule under consideration . . .
effectively prevents the national courts from maintaining the rights of citizens against the encroachment of
the states, as far as those rights are affected by positive restrictions.‖ Id. at 149. (emphasis added).
241
Id. at 150.
237
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Pomeroy again spoke of ―injustice and oppression‖ 242 indicating that ―the proposed fourteenth
amendment‖ would provide the ―nation with complete power to protect its citizens against local
injustice and oppression . . . which beyond all doubt, should be conferred upon [the nation].‖243
Thus, like others who endorsed the Amendment, Pomeroy saw it was a means of providing
double security for the rights of citizens—once by the state and a second time by the nation.
V.
Fairman, Frankfurter, Black; Berger and Curtis
In a prior work I have documented the overwhelming consensus that until 1949, the SlaughterHouse Cases and, in some instances, Cruikshank, were wrongly decided. 244 Some scholars
praised that result and some condemned it, but there was at least a consensus on the result. 245
Justice Hugo Black‘s dissent in Adamson v. California, 246 broke with the celebration of the
nullification the Fourteenth Amendment.
It was Charles Fairman‘s work in 1949, with the help of Justice Frankfurter and Justice
Jackson, that turned the tide of scholarship and developed a theoretical and claimed historical
basis for what the Court did in Adamson and its prior decisions. Ironically, at the same time
Fairman was making such in-roads in the academic world, Justice Black was winning the battle in
the Supreme Court for applying the Bill of Rights to the states.
In his article for this symposium, Professor Curtis accurately explains the hegemony that
Professor Fairman and, later, his classmate and fellow Frankfurter student, Raoul Berger,
exercised on this topic from 1949 until the mid-1980s. 247 As Professor Kurt Lash has indicated,
Michael Kent Curtis‘ No State Shall Abridge ―brought together the historical evidence in the
most comprehensive and most persuasive way that had ever been done and pretty much put to rest
much of the serious discussion about whether the Bill of Rights should ever be incorporated. He
had enormous impact‖ in academia.

248

In the words of Professor Randy Barnett, Curtis ―proved

that the established conventional wisdom among academics was just wrong‖ 249 and Curtis
became ―a hero in the subject.‖ 250 Professor Curtis‘ account of his involvement in research in
this area and its evolution is contained in the first portion of his article in this symposium issue.
242

Id. at 151.
Id.
244
See also Section IV of this article for illustrative quotations to support that view.
245
Aynes, supra note 9, at 681-686.
246
332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947).
247
Curtis, supra note ____, at ___. {JCLI at 2-7} Raoul Berger‘s primary work was his book RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUREENTH AMEMDENT (1977). He
published many articles on the subject and published a second edition of this book in 1997.
248
Discussion, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 1009 (2008).
249
Id. at 1010.
250
Id.
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There have, of course, been other important scholarly contributions to the development of our

understanding in this area. 252
VII.
George Thomas and Bryan Wildenthal
The discussion between George C. Thomas III and Bryan Wildenthal in many ways
represents academia at its best. Unlike Charles Fairman, who identified W. W. Crosskey at an
AALS Annual Meeting by his name tag, but purposely avoided having any conversation with
him, 253 their writings in the Ohio State Law Journal254 , e-mail exchanges, and interaction at the
conference in San Diego, have involved polite and congenial exchanges by people of good will
who nevertheless make clear their points of disagreement. This is heartening.
Professor Thomas‘ pursuit of the many on-line newspapers from the 19th Century is a step in
the right direction. Indeed, at the University of Akron School of Law Constitutional Law Center
—one of four such centers created by the U.S. Congress in commemoration of the bi-centennial
of the U.S. Constitution in 1987— we have begun ―The 39th Congress Project.‖ This project is
designed to produce more biographical information about the many members of the 39th Congress
and locate their out-of-Congress speeches on the Fourteenth Amendment and other relevant
issues. 255 The hope is that over time, law students will utilize the rich on-line resources to help
create biographical sketches that will help enrich our understanding of what these Congressmen
were doing and thinking. Professor Thomas has graciously agreed to participate in this project
and I would welcome others who would be willing to do so. 256 I applaud Professor Thomas for
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Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the States: An Overview from One Perspective, __-___
{JCLI 1-5}.
252
This includes, of course, the individuals I have cited and many others too numerous to mention.
253
Aynes, supra note 9, at 1249-1250 ; see also the less than temperate remarks exchanged between
Fairman and Crosskey in print. Id. at 1255 and n.386.
254
Bryan Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original Understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1866–67, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 1509 (2007); George C. Thomas III, The Riddle of
the Fourteenth Amendment: A Response to Professor Wildenthal, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 1727 (2007).
255
The web site, http://www.uakron.edu/law/constitutionallaw/39thcongressproject.php, currently contains
the paper for Robin Lau (J.D. May 2009) on Congressman James M. Ashley (R-Ohio). A request to post
an additional paper on Thaddeus Stevens (R-Pa.) has been made. Papers are currently being written on
Rufus Spalding (R-Ohio), John Bingham‘s (R-Ohio) role in the creation of West Virginia, and James A.
Garfield (R-Ohio).
256
The approach is to try to obtain ―support‖ from ―participating‖ law faculty members who might offer
advanced seminars in constitutional law, legal history or some related area. If we had only 100
participating professors and they gave their students the option of writing a paper on some member of the
39th Congress that would be a great start. If even one student in the classes of a one-fourth of the 100
participating professors wrote an article each year, that would produce 25 new biographical sketches that
could be added to the Center‘s web site for use by all scholars. Others who would like to participate in this
project can contact me at raynes@uakron.edu.
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his important effort at beginning the discovery of relevant newspaper articles which would help
everyone who has an interest in the area.
At the same time, in my view is Professor Thomas‘ pioneering efforts are only a tentative first
step and have not yet matured to the point where one can draw conclusions from his effort.
Though they cannot be exhaustive, set forth below are three reasons for this conclusion.
A.
Better than Newspapers
To be sure, newspaper accounts would be one way in which politically active people who
were elected to the legislature would obtain their information. 257 But this is not the only, or even
the primary, source.
Personal contact would be the best. Over the years Congressmen worked closely with
local members of the state legislature and other local officials. For an individual who had to run
for re-election, personal contact with local officials was crucial. Such contact might include not
only face-to-face meetings, but letters and other mailings from Washington. Moreover, all
Congressmen had a motive to keep in close contact with their allies in the legislature to be reelected and because the legislature itself elected the U.S. Senators.
In addition, the voters would have ample opportunity to hear the views of the
Congressmen by listening to their speeches. For example, we are told that Congressman James
Garfield made over fifty speeches during the 1860 presidential campaign. 258 The account of the
adoption of the original Constitution is no doubt applicable to the Amendment as well: ―There
were hundreds, perhaps thousands, of local elections for which there are probably no extant
records.‖ 259
Further, we know that during this era many people had their own subscription to the
Congressional Globe and followed the debates of Congress through the Globe, thus giving them
knowledge independent of the newspapers.260 The Congressmen themselves were provided with
not only their own copy of the Globe, but with twenty-four extra copies 261 which they apparently
gave to political allies. Thus, with a Congress of 235 members, there were 5,640 copies of the
257

Professor Thomas believes that ―busy‖ members of the legislature would not follow the debates in
Congress. But I want to suggest just the opposite. The position of a state legislator was not considered a
full-time job and the legislative sessions were much shorter than today.
258
THEODORE CLARKE SMITH, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD 150-152 (1925).
259
Raoul Berger, Original Intent and Boris Bittker, 66 IND. L. J. 723, 742 (1991).
260
Two individuals who followed the actions of Congress with particular care were Justice Miller and
Chief Justice Chase. Aynes, supra note 176 at 660-661 (examples of Miller following Congress closely); I
SALMON P. CHASE PAPERS 610 (John Niven ed., 1993) (example of his knowing of a ―great speech‖ that
Bingham gave that very day).
261
TREFOUSSE, supra note 69, at 39.
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Globe that could be distributed to their political allies. This is more than enough copies for each
member of Congress to distribute to the state legislative members whose districts overlapped with
his own. Thus the entire legislature could have been covered, if they so desired. 262

We know that as early as the 1780s, pamphlets, newspaper reporters, speeches, and letters
―bombarded the voters.‖ 263 We also know that thousands of ―reprints‖ of the speeches of
Congressmen were sent to constituents and others, by the speaker, by other congressmen, and by
political parties. During General William T. Sherman‘s Atlanta campaign, as the 1864
Presidential election approached, ―[p]amphlets of political speeches flooded the camp . . . .‖ 264
The use of pamphlets was a critical part of political communication during the Civil War
and Reconstruction area. In speaking of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, historian T. Harry
Williams pointed out the importance of this form of communication and tied it to the ability of
government officials, including Congressmen, to ―frank‖ the documents to key political players:
Pamphlet writers formed an essential part of Stanton‘s propaganda machine.
He knew the efficiency of this medium of dissemination in an America which
read avidly all the political documents franked out of Washington. 265
An example of this practice is found in a letter from James G. Blaine (R-Maine) to Israel
Washburn (R-Ill.) reporting in 1856 that Blaine was present when ―five or six bushels‖ of franked
reports from T. J. D. Fuller (D-Maine) were brought into the post office. 266 These pamphlets
were often circulated in large numbers. For example, after President Johnson vetoed the
Freedman‘s Bureau bill, Congressman John Lynch (R-Maine) indicated that 100,000 copies of
Senator Trumbull‘s (R-Ill.) reply would be ―sent to the Country.‖ 267 When the Report of the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction was completed, 150,000 copies were distributed across the
nation. This was a larger number than the subscriptions to most newspapers. 268 During this era,
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Professor Thomas also claims that the ―average state legislator‖ would not have read the speeches of
Bingham and, assumptively, of other Congressmen like Howard. Thomas, supra note ___, at 41. Again,
this is the application of 21st century views to 19th century reality. In this age before electricity and all the
technology which occupies our time, the people of the 19 th century focused upon politics, court
proceedings, and religious activities. This was the ―entertainment‖ of that era.
263
Burger, supra note 259, at 742.
264
LORLE PORTER, A PEOPLE SET APART: SCOTCH-IRISH IN EASTERN OHIO 693 (1998).
265
T. HARRY WILLIAMS, LINCOLN AND THE RADICALS 235 (1965) (emphasis added).
266
James G. Blaine to Israel Washburn, August 2, 1856 quoted in GAILLARD HUNT , ISRAEL, ELIHU, AND
CADWEALLADER WASHBURN 49 (1925) (reprint 1969) (speculating that these were copies of Stephen A.
Douglas‘ report on Kansas).
267
HUNT, supra note 266, at 119 (quoting John Lynch to Israel Washburn, Feb. 21, 1866).
268
BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 26465 (1914).
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it was common for individuals to correspond about having received and read such pamphlets269 or
for people to write a speaker and request copies of a speech. 270
One such pamphlet that received widespread circulation was Bingham‘s Fourteenth
Amendment speech of February 25, 1866 with the title ―In support of the proposed amendment to
enforce the Bill of Rights.‖271 Sometimes the speeches of multiple speakers were re-printed
together. 272 Again, these reached the hands of common voters and politically active people like
members of the legislature and other office-holders. Indeed, by its private printing and mailing,
newspaper accounts, and printing in pamphlet form by various organizations, it is estimated that
President Lincoln‘s letter to Erastus Corning on the military arrest of former Congressman
Clement Vallandigham ―at least 500,000 copies‖ of the letter ―were read by 10,000,000 people.‖
273

This was also a day in which leaders could influence others privately. According to
historian Harold Hyman, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase believed that both the Thirteenth and the
Fourteenth Amendments enforced the Bill of Rights against the states. 274 In Chase‘s diary entry
of May 10, 1866, he made reference to Bingham‘s ―great speech‖ of that afternoon. 275 Later,
Chase indicated that he urged white southern leaders to make the adoption of the Fourteenth
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E.g., Rev. Amory Battles to Israel Washburn, Feb. 8, 1859 quoted in HUNT, supra note 266 at 62.
E.g., J. N. Stearns & Co. to Israel Washburn, Mar.13, 1858 quoted in HUNT, supra note 266 at 56
(asking for copies of speeches, though understanding he could not ―neglect‖ his own constituents‖); J.D.
Andrews to Israel Washburn, (referring to his ―great speech‖ and asking him to ―[s]end me some copies
here, when printed . . . .‖). Id. at 61.
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See inside cover of AKHIL AMAR, supra note 5, where this pamphlet with its title is partially reprinted.
(emphasis added by underlining). See also OhioLink Search.
272
E.g. ―Reconstruction.‖ Remarks of Hon. J. A. Bingham, of Ohio, and Hon. T. Stevens, of Pennsylvania
(Congressional Globe Office, Washington D.C., 1867); ―Reconstruction: speeches of Hon. S. W. Scofield,
of Penn., and Hon. John A. Bingham, of Ohio,‖ delivered in the United States House of Representatives
(Jan. 20, 1868); Two per cent. Claims of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois: report of the Judiciary Committee on
the two per cent. Fund: with remarks on the same subject by Hon. Jeremiah M. Wilson of Indiana, Hon.
Michael Kerr of Indiana, Hon. John B. Hawley of Illinois, Hon. John Bingham of Ohio.
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DOUGLAS L. WILSON, LINCOLN‘S SWORD, THE PRESIDENT AND THE POWER OF WORDS 178 (2008).
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Harold M. Hyman, Salmon Portland Chase, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
136 (Kermit Hall ed., 1992); see also Curtis, supra note 76 at 48 (―Republicans believed that the
Thirteenth Amendment effectively overruled Dred Scott so that blacks were entitled to all rights of
citizens.‖).
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I THE SALMON P. CHASE PAPERS 610 (John Niven ed., 1993). Chase‘s beliefs on the application of the
Bill of Rights to the states – something that should not be surprising given Chase‘s civil rights activity and
the fact that we know he followed Bingham‘s speeches in the Congress – it is doubtful he would join the
opinion in Twitchell if the Fourteenth Amendment issue had been fairly before the Court. This confirms
the analysis of Professor Amar and others that the matter was not properly presented. AMAR, supra note 5,
at 206-07. Further, one should note that it would be inconsistent to accept the application of technical
pleading requirements in a case like Cruikshank and then say they do not apply in a case like Twitchell.
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Amendment the platform for the 1866 campaign and the ―true policy‖ for the south. 276 This is
just one example of how the speeches that might not be published in southern papers, might
nevertheless have influence upon southern representatives.
Thus, while we can appreciate the importance of newspapers, we ought not to forget
that there were other and, at times, more effective ways for members of state legislatures to
receive information about the views of Congress on the Fourteenth Amendment. None of these
other options are considered in Professor Thomas‘ article.
B.
The Importance of Context
When sociologist Pamela Brandwein examined the debate by Fairman and Crosskey over
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, she concluded that the ―lens‖ or ―frame‖ from
which Fairman viewed the debates hindered Fairman‘s ability ―to bracket (or historicize) the
orthodoxy his own era produced‖ and produced misconceptions about what he read.277 This same
phenomena is illustrated in Professor Thomas puzzlement on his allegation that Senator Howard‘s
―speech was ignored in the Senate chamber . . . .‖ 278 In fact, exactly the opposite was true, and
Professor Wildenthal is correct that the lack of any meaningful response is a testimony to the
acceptance and impact of the speech.279

276

CHASE, supra note 275, at 632 (Sept. 5, 1866, including Governor Hamilton of Texas and Louisiana
Republican Durant) and 640 (Sept. 25, 1866, former U.S. and Confederate Congressman William W.
Boyce of South Carolina and Dr. Duperioer, who I have not been able to identify).
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PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 128 (1999).
278
Thomas, supra note ___, at 9. In my view, some of the newspaper articles are read in a modern context
and without the context of the 19th Century through which its original readers would have lived. However,
I will defer discussion of these until the project moves further along and use the treatment of Senator
Howard as an illustration.
279
Instead of disputing the statements Howard made on behalf of the Joint Committee, those who oppose
the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states often attempt to discredit Howard in some way.
Because Howard was a ―radical‖, for that reason alone Berger thought that Howard unworthy of belief. As
an example of his untrustworthiness Berger noted that Howard (like Lincoln) advocated that at least some
African Americans should be allowed to vote. Berger, supra note 247, at 147. George Thomas says that
Howard‘s ―remarks were very late in the process and no one picked up the incorporation banter, either to
embrace or criticize it.‖ Thomas, supra note ___, at {pre-conference draft. 6.}.
Yet, Howard‘s speech was the very first to be given on the Amendment in the Senate. CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764 (May 23, 1866). One must respectfully wonder how any speech in the Senate
could have ―come too late‖, let alone the opening speech by the person designated as the floor manager.
The debate in the Senate was not concluded until 15 days later, on June 8, 1866. Charles Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 135 (1949). The first state to
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Fessenden and Howard were long-time colleagues, having served together as Whig
members of the House of Representatives together in 1840-41.280 One of the joint projects on
which Fessenden and Howard worked in 1841 was the Joint Committee of Congress to
commemorate the death of President William Henry Harrison.281 Howard was personally chosen
by Senator Fessenden to make the presentation on the floor of the Senate and, contrary to claims
by some who would undermine Howard‘s speech, Fessenden was actually in the Senate listening
to Howard‘s presentation. 282
Further, when Jacob M. Howard spoke on the Fourteenth Amendment, he was not
speaking as an individual member of the Senate, no matter how influential. Rather, he was a

ratify the Amendment was Connecticut in June 1866 and the Amendment was not declared ratified until
Congress‘ resolution July 21, 1868 and Secretary of State Sewart‘s proclamation of July 28, 1868. It is not
self-evident why a speech on the meaning of an amendment that was not ratified until over two years later
was or could be ―too late.‖
Indeed, Chairman Fessenden obviously reached the opposite conclusion of Professor Thomas,
because in an exchange with Senator Sumner right before Howard's speech, Fessenden indicated that after
the House had passed the proposal ―I thought it well. . . [that it] should lie upon the table for awhile in order
to give the gentlemen ample opportunity to consider it . . .‖ CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768
(1866).
280

Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-Present, available at
bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp.
281
BANGOR DAILY WHIG & COURIER, (Bangor, Maine), Jan. 3, 1866, col. C.
282
FRANCIS FESSENDEN, LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICE OF WILLIAM PITT FESSENDEN 61-62 (1907) (―…Mr.
Fessenden . . . gave the amendment to the charge of Senator Howard.‖) (―Mr. Fessenden was in his seat and
participated in the debate, explaining why some of the amendments were thought necessary.‖). Of course,
Fessenden could have chosen from the Joint Committee Senator James Grimes (R-Iowa), George W.
Williams (R-Or.), Justin Morrill (R-Vt.) or Ira Harris (R-N.Y.) to make the presentation, but did not do so.
On Fessenden‘s presence in the Senate during the debates see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2761 (casting a vote on an amendment to a bill to authorize the building of a railroad bridge between
Wisconsin and Minnesota), 2762 (asking Senator Henderson two questions on two different occasions
about the same bill) and 2763 (noting his disagreement with Senator Sumner about the propriety of taking
up the discussion on the Fourteenth Amendment and making a statement on the process which fills two
columns of the Globe) (May 23,1866). It should be noted that the two-column statement of Senator
Fessenden is only approximately two columns before Senator Howard began his speech. Id. at 2764.
Further, Chairman Fessenden indicated that he might take part in the debate, but that it would ―depend
on circumstances not entirely within my control.‖ CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768 (1866).
We all make mistakes. While I do not doubt that the inference that Fessenden was not present in the Senate,
drawn from Howard‘s speech, and the oversight in not reading the portion of the Globe just two columns
before Howard‘s speech showing that Fessenden was present in the Senate were mistakes made in complete
good faith, I do think they show the hazards of selectively reading the Globe and of relying upon inferences
without checking to see whether there are facts which confirm or refute the inference.
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member of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction and speaking on behalf of the Joint
Committee. War hero, General, Congressman and future President James A. Garfield called the
people on the Joint Committee ―the truest and best men in Congress. . . .‖

283

Howard‘s role as spokesman for the Committee is confirmed by the content of the speech
itself. Even a cursory look at the Journal of the Joint Committee reveals that while Howard
ultimately supported reporting the entire Amendment to the Congress, in the behind-the-scenes
struggle over its content he was not a champion of Section 1 and, in fact, frequently voted against
it. This was Bingham‘s proposal and the fact that Howard‘s discussion is supportive of and
consistent with Bingham‘s account in the House is evidence that Howard was being faithful to
what was discussed and agreed upon in the Joint Committee.
In support of Howard‘s accuracy and honesty, it should be noted that he was a ―respected‖
member of the Senate 284 and that he openly pointed out on the floor his disappointment at not
being able obtain at least some limited provision for voting by African American males. 285
Howard‘s standing in the Senate is also shown by the amendment of the Amendment in the
Senate. Rather than moving into obscurity, one of the first things that happened after Howard‘s
speech was that the Republicans chose him for another leadership role regarding the Fourteenth
Amendment. After various Republican caucuses in which the Amendment was discussed,
Howard, Fessenden, and James W. Grimes (R-Iowa) were designated as a committee of three to
prepare the proposals based upon the discussion in the caucus. 286 It was caucus leader Benjamin
Wade (R-Ohio) who made the initial motion to add a citizenship clause. 287 But Howard (RMich.) had a different view and it was Howard‘s view that prevailed over the leader of the
Republican caucus. 288 Fessenden also took an active role, obtaining the addition of the words ―or
naturalized‖ to the citizenship clause. 289
These post-caucus proceedings show Howard‘s standing in the Senate, and equally as
important, Fessenden‘s willingness to intervene if he disagreed with Howard. Yet, there was no
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―Speech of the Hon. J. A. Garfield, of Ohio‖, CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 63, at 18 (Toledo, Aug.
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MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE 184 (1974).
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Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment in UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
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intervention by Fessenden on Howard‘s description of the meaning of the privileges or
immunities clause. If this was a matter of discussion in the Republican caucus, it must have been
satisfactory because there were no post-caucus discussions, no clarification or disavowal of
Howard‘s speech and no proposed amendment with respect to the privileges or immunities
clause, like there was with other portions of proposed Amendment.290 Because the Amendment
avoided all radical proposals and was the product of the moderates, it became the basis upon
which all members of the Party could rally around. 291 Except for the portions amended in the
Senate, there was simply nothing controversial in the proposal and no reason for extended
discussion.
Professor Thomas also claims there was no response to Howard‘s views. In this claim
Professor Thomas has inadvertently fallen into error because Howard‘s views were disputed by at
least two Senators, Reverdy Johnson (D-Md.) and Senator Thomas A. Hendricks
(D-Ind.). 292 I will focus upon Senator Reverdy Johnson (D-Md.) who had represented the
slaveholder in Dred Scott, and in the Joint Committee voted against reporting out the
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Professor Thomas appears to look for a chorus of Senator who will stand up and say ―me too‖ to
Howard‘s speech. Thomas, supra note ___, at ___ {JCLI 16}(Howard‘s speech ―dropped into the pond . .
. without leaving a ripple.‖). But this is not how the legislative process worked. Howard spoke for the
entire Join Committee, including its Chairman Senator Fessenden and four other members of the Senate,
excluding Senator Johnson (D-Md.). Their unanimous support for the Amendment in the Joint Committee
needed no further statements beyond their votes in the Senate which were also unanimous. The votes of the
entire Senate was also overwhelming, 33-11, with five Senators absent. Of those absent, only one was a
Republican.
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Aynes, supra note 56, at 385.
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Professor Rosenthal cites speeches from three Democratic opponents of the amendment (without
indicating that they were Democrats), Senator Johnson (D-Md.), Senator Thomas A. Hendricks (D-Ind.),
and Representative William W. Boyer (D-Pa.) citing. as authority George C. Thomas III, The Riddle of the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Response to Professor Wildenthal, 68 OHIO ST. L, J. 1627, 1633, 1646 (2007).
In the revision made between the conference and the final article Professor Thomas tries to make his
statements consistent by asserting that there was a difference between Senator Johnson and Senator
Hendricks claiming they did not ―understand‖ the meaning of the Amendment and ―responding to
Howard‘s theory.‖ Thomas, supra note ___ at ___. {JCLI at 14 of the draft.}
While this is an interesting approach, it is flawed for on at least fourth separate grounds.
First, as set forth in the text to follow, this was not the ―theory‖ of Senator Howard, but rather the
understating of the meaning of the privileges or immunities clause by the Republican members of the Joint
committee – the leaders and most influential members of the Senate and the House.
Second, as developed in the text, there is substantial pre and post amendment evidence to suggest that
Johnson did understand the meaning of the amendment in the same way that Howard articulated it and
Johnson was simply being untruthful in his statements on the Senate floor.
Third, Johnson‘s claim is clearly inconsistent with the explanation given by Howard. If Thomas‘ view of
the legislative process were true, then anyone opposed to an amendment could help defeat its avowed
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Amendment. 293 In a June 8, 1866 speech Senator Johnson professed support for the citizenship
clause and the due process clause. 294 He made no mention of the equal protection clause, but he
opposed the privileges or immunities clause upon the claimed ground that ―I do not understand
what will be the effect of that.‖ 295 As Professor Wildenthal documents, Senator Johnson moved
to strike the clause from the Amendment and his views were not even considered worthy of
debate or a roll-call vote in rejecting the motion. 296
This is particularly interesting for multiple reasons. First, like President Johnson who
helped to sponsor, along with some of his appointed Provisional Governors, a short-lived
conservative counter-Fourteenth Amendment whose primary changes were to the privileges or
immunities clause, Senator Johnson apparently had a real fear of that clause. Thus, we see a
convergence between leading opponents (President Johnson, Senator Johnson, leading anti-war
Democrat Vallandigham, as well as the Provisional Governors under President Johnson) of the
privileges and immunities clause and the proponents of the clause in Congress who all saw it as
an important portion of Section 1. 297 How much sense does it make to ignore and treat as a
nullity the key provision of the Amendment?
Second, we have to take Johnson‘s claim to ―not understand‖ its effect with a large amount
of skepticism. In part, this is because he not only heard Howard‘s speech but he undoubtedly
heard Bingham and others discuss the effect in the Joint Committee. Further, because Johnson
argued Dred Scott he knew of the Chief Justice‘s conclusion that if African Americans were U.S.
Citizens, their privilege and immunities under Article IV would give them ―the full liberty of
speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold

intent by simply arguing against the amendment without specifically recognizing the arguments for the
amendment. This is contrary to common usage and common sense.
Fourth. Johnson clearly did not speak for the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. He was in the distinct
minority that voted against reporting out the amendment. He clearly did not speak for the Senate, because
he was in the distinct minority that voted against the Amendment and his weak attempt to amendthe
Amendment by deleting the privileges and immunities clause was an utter failure, not even warranting
debate or a roll call vote. In contrast, Howard spoke for the Joint Committee. Professor Thomas is willing
to embrace the view of Johnson – even though no one else in the Senate mentioned Johnson by name or did
an analysis his speech. Yet, he argues that in spite of his leadership position, Howard‘s views were ignored
because no one said ―amen‖ to Howard‘s speech. One would think that an even-handed approach, at the
very least, would be that Howard and Johnson would be treated equally and, more logically, that Howard‘s
leadership position as the floor manager with Fessenden‘s blessing should count for more than Johnson‘s
isolated views.
293
KENDRICK, supra note 268, at 114.
294
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3041 (June 8, 1866).
295
Id.
296
Wildenthal, supra note 4, at ____. {JCLI at 143 and n. 486}
297
Professor Thomas thinks this is true as well. Thomas, supra note ___, at ___. {manuscript at 30}
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public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.‖ 298 This
is confirmed by Senator Johnson‘s post-ratification action when he frequently represented KKK
terrorists and Democrats opposed to Republicans and republican governments; he conceded that
the privileges and immunities clause included the right to bear arms. 299
C.
Significant Methodology problems
Professor Thomas has appropriately indicated that we really cannot evaluate the newspaper
articles until we have read the actual article. 300 Yet, he is candid in his indication: ―I am not sure
how accurate the search engines are. On occasion, I would get a different number of hits when
running the very same search.‖ 301
Inaccurate search engines are not an overwhelming obstacle if one is simply looking
for relevant articles. Even if one misses a few articles or has to do the search multiple times,
important findings can still be made. Indeed, Professor Thomas has already identified and
summarized some articles in which many people working in the Fourteenth Amendment area will
have an interest. This is significant contribution.
However, there is a difference between finding articles of interest and trying to prove a
negative by indicating that there are no (or few) relevant newspaper stories. In order to do the
latter, the search— like a scientific experiment— must be capable of replication by others. If
Professor Thomas himself cannot always replicate his own study, it seems unlikely that others
can do so.
Of even greater importance, Professor Thomas has misapprehended the nature of the data
base he is searching. 302 Professor Thomas indicates that the data base he used contained 3,306
newspapers. 303 He believes the number of newspapers searched is important (as it is), because he
mentions, a second time, that he searched a data base that has ―over 3,000 newspapers.‖304 A
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Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 417 (1857).
Aynes, supra note 31, at 98 n.263. It is possible, of course, that Senator Johnson was referring to not
knowing the meaning and effect of the non-Bill of Rights privileges and immunities. But, if so, that does
not support Professor Thomas‘s analysis.
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Thomas, supra note __, at __. [JCLI 3] I have invited Professor Thomas to send me copies of the
newspapers he uses so that, if there are no copyright issues, they can be scanned and placed upon the ―39 th
Congress Project‖ web site for all to use.
301
Thomas, supra note ___, at 6. {January 22, 2009 paper} In the conference presented at the University
of San Diego, the most questions for the panel on which Professor Thomas, Professor Wildenthal and I
participated, were about Professor Thomas‘s search technique. But I set those to one side given the
nascent nature of the project and assume if there is any concern, it will be addressed in the future.
302
This is newspaperarchieve.com
303
Thomas, supra note ___, at (1/22/09 version at 6).
304
Thomas, supra note ___, at ___ {1/22/09 version at 33}
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history of newspapers indicates that there were 3,000 newspapers in the U.S. in 1860 and 4,500 in
1870.305 This might lead one to unthinkingly conclude that the data base utilized contained
almost 74% of all the available newspapers in 1870 or 110% in 1860. 306 The latter impossibility
should be a warning to alert everyone to the fact that there are significant methodological
problems.
The methodological problems begin with the fact that the data base does not limit its
journals to the key times of 1866–1868 or even the Civil War and Reconstruction era. Rather the
data base covers two hundred fifty years (1759 to 2009) and it includes newspapers from eight
foreign countries. 307 We do not know how many of those newspapers were in existence in the
key time-period for us (whichever time period we choose308). This is the profile with which I was
provided:
*They claim to have at least one publication from 3315 newspapers (spanning 17592009);
*They have at least one publication for 161 U.S. newspapers in 1860;
*They have at least one publication for 84 U.S. newspapers in 1868; and
*They have at least one publication for 260 U.S. newspapers in 1900.
If we take the number of newspapers in the data base for 1860 and use the papers estimated to
exist in 1860, Professor Thomas has only searched 5.4% of the newspapers.309 If we use the
number of newspapers in the data base for 1868 and the number of newspapers in existence in
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Mitchell Stephens, History of Newspapers (for Collier‘s Encyclopedia)
http://www.nyu.edu/classes/stephens/Collier%27s%20page.htm (last observed June 5, 2009). Crosskey,
supra note 11, at 101, indicates that there were 4,967 newspapers in 1870, citing HUDSON, JOURNALISM IN
THE UNITED STATES 771 (1873).
306
We know, of course, this is impossible.
307
I appreciate the work of Assistant Law Librarian Annette Souare and her assistants in conducting this
research. At the time they did the search the number of newspapers had increased to 3,315. The good
news appears to be that this data base appears to continue to grow. A printout made on March 6, 2009
indicates that there are nine newspapers from Canada, one from Denmark, one from Ireland, eight from
Jamaica, one from South Africa, ten from the United Kingdom, and one from the Virgin Islands.
308
I would, of course, choose 1866-1868. See supra note 296 {This is not the correct fn. in the version
sent to me and may have been changed by my changes in this new version.}. I realize others may
choose different time period. But the question is the same for each time period: what is the universe of
newspapers in the data base for that time period?
309
I realize that the number of newspapers could change over a period of years. For example, if I read
Professor Thomas‘ paper correctly, he has cited newspapers for a five year period: 1865-1869. We do not
know how many total newspapers were available in the data base during that period. We cannot simply
multiply the 1868 number by five, because new newspapers were founded and old newspapers went out of
business. Multiplying the 1868 number would probably inflate the number of relevant newspapers
Professor Thomas has consulted. For example, if 50 of those 68 papers were in existence for all five years
Professor Thomas surveyed, to multiply the 68 papers times 5 would count the same fifty papers as if they
were 250 papers. In any event, since this is his study, the task of identifying the total number of relevant
time-period newspapers he has surveyed is his task, given that he wants to use them to prove the absence of
coverage.
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1870, he has only searched 1.9% of the newspapers. 310 In fact, however, we do not know and it
appears that Professor Thomas does not know how many relevant newspapers he has been
actually searching. This explains why he is not finding articles which have been found through
normal research or articles in important papers that we know exist. It also means that we cannot
rely upon the absence of documents in his search to support his claim.
In sum, while this is an interesting first effort, it is still in its nascent stage and until more
comprehensive searches can be conducted, the searches can be replicated, and the methodology
issues can be resolved, it is premature to place any reliance on the current results.
VII.
Professor Donald Dripps and the Grand Jury
Professor Dripps tells an interesting tale about the ―first criminal law revolution‖ and
there is no doubt that at the core, this is an important part of our legal history.311 And yet, it
hardly seems to support the weight he would put upon it.
He combines in this ―first revolution‖ three components: the grand jury (―an
anachronism‖), the privilege against self-incrimination, and the party incapacity rule. 312 But if
one thinks about this ―revolution‖ one must conclude that it was a pretty feeble one. Yes, the
party incapacity rule was abolished in the federal courts as well as the state courts. But the grand
jury requirement and the right against self-incrimination are still safely protected by the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Thus, ―the anachronism‖ still lives on more than two
hundred years after the Fifth Amendment was adopted and more than one hundred forty years
after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. At the very least, we know this was not a
successful national revolution. Nor was any movement against the right against selfincrimination successful. According to Professor Kenneth Katkin:
Since the earliest days of the Republic, the constitutions of all but two states
also have always expressly protected the right of individuals against compelled
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If we use the number of newspapers identified by Crosskey, 4,967 in 1870, and compare it to the
number of newspapers for 1868 in the database used by Professor Thomas, then the percentage of
newspapers at which he has searched falls to 1.3%.
311
Donald A. Dripps, The Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights, and the (First) Criminal Procedure
Revolution, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES___ (2009).
312
Dripps, supra note 311, at 5. He claims, in part, that the ―[p]olice assumed the investigative functions of
the jp, and public prosecutors took over the charging process from the grand jury.‖ Id. This is said to have
been caused by increasing urbanization. Yet the census records for 1870 indicate the rural population of
the U.S. was 74.3% . Without more information, the overwhelming rural population suggests that
urbanization cannot have been the cause of any change or the change was very small. See U. S. Census,
Table 4, Population: 1790-1990, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/files/table-4.pdf.
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self-incriminations. Moreover, both of the states that lack express constitution
provisions [Iowa and New Jersey] also have protected the right against selfincrimination continuously since before the Civil War. 313
No doubt articles will continue to be written about the need to abolish or reform the
grand jury. But the issue does not seem to have ―caught fire.‖ Where is the national movement
to abolish the federal grand jury provisions? Was this even mentioned in the 2008 elections?
Further, if we look to the relevant time period (1866-68), it is clear that the number of states
interested in avoiding the grand jury was a distinct and slender minority. According to Dripps,
the ―first victory for Bentham reformers‖ seeking to dispense with the grand jury came in
Michigan when a statute to that effect was adopted in 1859.314 If I read Professor Dripp‘s paper
correctly, while some others may have removed their Grand Jury requirement, no other state
authorized proceeding without a grand jury until 1868 when Kansas passed a statute permitting
prosecutors to proceed by information.315 Thus, at best, this mini-revolution was engaged in by
only two of the thirty-seven316 states at the time.
Even that has to be qualified, because Senator Howard, the former Attorney General of
Michigan (1856-1861), supported the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states, even
though he must have known of Michigan‘s alternative procedure. This is consistent with Bryan
Wildenthal‘s point that treatise writers who did not like the grand jury would nevertheless support
incorporation because having a grand jury was clearly a much lesser evil than not passing the
Fourteenth Amendment. 317 For example, in Ohio, even though the voters had previously rejected
a complicated provision which would have given the right to vote to African American males, its
Congressional delegation joined in proposing the Fifteenth Amendment and the Ohio Legislature
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Kenneth Katkin, Fourteenth Amendment ―Incorporation‖ of the Criminal Procedure Amendments: The
View From the States, 84 NEB. L. REV. 397, 431-32 (2005). As Professor Dripps points out, because of the
prevalence of the incapacity rule, there was no comment upon silence issue. But the ―revolution‖ seems to
have suffered a serious set back in 1878—when it was supposed to be going strong— by the adoption of a
no comment rule by the Congress. See id. at 435 n.187 (citing 20 Stat. 30, Ch 37 (1878)). Further, at the
time Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (overruling Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947)), was
decided, states had the approval of the Supreme Court to comment upon an individual‘s invocation of the
right, but forty-four states prohibited this and only six states allowed it. Id. at 435.
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Dripps, supra note 311, at 7.
Dripps, supra note 311, at 11 n.52. Kansas ratified the Fourteenth Amendment on January 11, 1867.
Thus, the 1868 statute was passed after Kansas has ratified, but we do not know if the statute was passed
before the amendment was actually adopted by the requisite number of states. While Dripps includes other
states with later adoptions, it should be noted that California did not ratify the Fourteenth Amendment until
1959.
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I have included in the total number of states —Texas, Mississippi and Virginia—which were not
represented in Congress during the 1868 Presidential Election.
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Wildenthal, supra note 4, at ____. {JCLI at 47-51, 63, 78-79, and 83-84 }
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ratified that Amendment in 1870. Senator Howard was apparently willing to do the same with
respect to the grand jury. Unlike the ―revolution‖ against the prohibition amendment and the
―revolution‖ against the party incapacity rule, the ―revolution‖ against the protection against selfincrimination and the use of the grand jury was largely quashed.
I realize that many care deeply about the grand jury (or grand jury abuse) and I would
assume most of the attendees at the conference would prefer that it not exist because it is
commonly viewed as an unfair tool of the prosecutor. Nevertheless, I want to gently suggest that
compared to the avoiding another war in which 620,000 lives were lost, allowing the former
rebels to combine with Democrats to secure the fruits of the war, risking monetary claims of $1.62 billion by former rebels for emancipated slaves,318 risking the taxation of loyal Southern
Unionists to help pay a rebel debt of $ 3 billion, 319 and a host of other matters covered by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the question of whether one has a grand jury or not is a minor and even
unimportant matter, which pales into insignificance.320
Indeed, if one thinks about this for a while, it should be clear that the grand jury was
never an important issue in the minds of the voters. The average adult voter will be called for
jury duty, even if they do not ultimately serve. But the average adult can live his/her whole life
without having any contact with the grand jury. The average adult will tell one (perhaps
incorrectly) that a jury is composed of twelve individuals. But even very good lawyers may not
know how many people serve on a grand jury and probably will never have any contact with a
grand jury.
The Fourteenth Amendment was viewed as a ―peace treaty‖ to end the Civil War,321 to
provide security against a future war,322 and to ―secure the fruits of victory.‖323 A key point is
that the First Congress proposed twelve amendments, only ten of which were contemporaneously
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The question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment, as a whole or in its parts, could reasonably be
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ratified. 324 Had the Fourteenth Amendment framers followed the precedent of the proponents of
the Bill of Rights, they would have submitted at least four separate amendments, each having its
own enforcement clause. This would have allowed the ratifiers to pick and choose among the
various proposals. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment obviously made a reasoned choice
to link these disparate amendments together. We can only surmise that the Congressmen did this
for the usual legislative reason: they thought they had a greater success of having these provisions
all passed collectively than if they were submitted individually. Thus understood, the framers
wanted to use the popular provisions of the Amendment to secure passage of its more
controversial provisions. This means that some of the consequences anticipated by the framers
may not have been intended or desired by all of the ratifiers.
As David Kyvig has written in his book, which received the Bancoft Prize, ―to combine a
number of proposals into a single measure subtly but perceptibly shifted critical decision-making
from the ratifiers to the initial adopters of an amendment resolution. Unlike the 1790s
experience, states would confront a take-it-or-leave it, all-or-nothing choice.‖ 325 Thus, unlike
other constitutional amendments, in which the concerns of the ratifiers may be paramount, the
framers have a large role to play in the Fourteenth Amendment. This insight may help unravel
why states would vote to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment and then not conform their state
constitution to comply with its provisions. While the full picture should include the view of both
the framers and the ratifiers, Professor Kyvig's insight is still critically important.
Even when examined in its parts, no loyal person from 1866 to 1868 would vote against
any section of the ―peace treaty‖ simply because of an aversion to grand jury requirements. This
applied, with even greater force, to the entire amendment combined. The stakes were too high:
what the Fourteenth Amendment promised was too important and what the grand jury provision
provided were too trivial by comparison.
With respect to the criminal procedure matters, there are at least three other observations of
note. First, Bingham himself was served as a highly regarded defense counsel in criminal cases
and was the prosecutor for Tuscarawas County, Ohio. 326 As it does today, at the time Bingham
was practicing criminal law, the Ohio Constitution required that indictments be made by grand
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juries. 327 There is nothing to suggest that when Bingham said the fourteenth amendment would
include enforcement of the Bill of Rights, he thought there was an exception for the grand jury
clause. Indeed, when Bingham recalled the framing of the amendment in 1871 and read the first
eight amendments to the House of Representatives, his reading of the Fifth Amendment included
both the right of indictment before a grand jury and the right against self-incrimination.328
A similar point can be made with respect to Senator Howard. When Howard indicated to
the Senate that the Amendment would enforce ―the first eight amendments‖ against the states,
there is no indication that he made any exceptions for the grand jury or any other provision. 329
Professor Dripps indicates that in his ―famous speech,‖ Senator Howard ―mentions many Bill-ofRight particulars, but not grand jury indictment‖ as if that in some way undermined Howard‘s
claim that ―the first eight amendments‖ were privileges or immunities under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 330 Professor Thomas makes substantially the same argument. 331 But a fuller
examination of Howard‘s speech belies this claim.
In his discussion of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities clause, Howard quoted
forty-seven lines of text in the Congressional Globe from Justice Bushrod Washington‘s opinion
in Corfield v. Coryell. 332 While that opinion lists certain privileges and immunities, a portion of
Corfield, also quoted by Senator Howard, stated Washington‘s opinion that: ―These, and many
others which might be mentioned [but were not], are, strictly, privileges and immunities‖ to be
enjoyed under the provision. 333 Senator Howard indicated that the privileges and immunities of
U.S. citizens ―cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature . . . .‖ 334
Nevertheless, referring to all of the Fourteenth Amendment rights outlined in Corfield, Howard
indicated that ―to these must be added the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first
eight amendments of the Constitution; . . . .‖ 335
Howard did not say the first eight amendments— excepting the two parts of the Fifth
Amendment to which Professor Dripps objects—are the privileges or immunities of U.S.
citizenship. Rather, Howard said ―the first eight amendments.‖ Immediately after the semicolon
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shown above, Howard proceeded to say ―such as‖ and then he paraphrased336 most, but not all of
the amendments. It is true that in his paraphrasing of the examples (―such as‖), Howard does not
include the right to a grand jury indictment. But the term ―such as‖ gives clear notice that other
matters are included. Further, Howard does clearly say ―secured by the first eight amendments
to the Constitution‖ and he puts the listener/reader on notice three times that his list is not
exhaustive: once when he quoted from Corfield; once when he said that all the privileges and
immunities cannot be outlined; and once when he used the terms ―such as.‖
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Given this

context, one cannot reasonably draw an inference from the omission of an example that Howard
did not mean what he said: that ―the first eight amendments‖ were to be enforced.
Bryan Wildenthal is surely correct when he writes:
Given the political imperatives for Republicans supporting
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is doubtful whether
anyone considered or cared much about the relatively minor particulars
in which some states were not already in conformity with the Bill of
Rights. That could have been worked out by litigation or legislation. 338
VIII.
Conclusion
A.
Summary
Together, Representative John A. Bingham and Senator Jacob M. Howard authored the
whole of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bingham was the floor manager in the House
and Senator Howard was the floor manger in the Senate. Both Bingham and Howard stated that
among the privileges and immunities of the Amendment were the rights protected under the
Federal Bill of Rights and these were to be enforced against the states. When they spoke, they
spoke not for themselves, but for the Joint Committee and, as the results show, for the
overwhelming majority of the Congress. The amendment passed by significant majorities in the
House (120-32) and the Senate (33-11).
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The Amendment itself was the central issue of the Congressional elections of 1866, and both the
Republicans and the Amendment won by overwhelming majorities. This election was a
―disastrous defeat‖ for President Johnson and his Democratic allies.339 Former Union General
and Republican Senator (R-Mo.) and later U.S. Secretary of the Interior (1877-81), Carl Schurz
had nothing but scorn for the Democratic claims of state rights, stating: ―In the name of liberty
[they] asserted the right of one man, under State law, to deprive another man of his freedom‖ and
―they will tell you now that they are no longer true freemen in their States because . . . [they] can
no longer deprive other men of their rights.‖340 The ―state rights‖ for which the Democrats
campaigned was the ―right‖ to exclude native born Blacks from citizenship and the rights to ―do
wrong‖ to Blacks and other Unionists. In spite of the opposition of the most racist President in
U.S. history and of the Democratic party, which chose to campaign almost exclusively upon race,
the Amendment was ratified, often with approval by overwhelming majorities in the individual
state legislatures. 341 Yet, sometime between five and eight years later it was a virtually nullity.
Indeed, it had been ―nullified‖ in the spirit of John C. Calhoun and suffered a fate not unlike the
Fifteenth Amendment was soon to suffer.
In the quest to determine the meaning of the privilege and immunities clause, others have
documented its long lineage and noted that the terms have been used in North America for over
two hundred fifty years before their use in the Fourteenth Amendment.342 Though it is no doubt
true that the two words once served distinctive purposes, at least by the time of Justice Miller‘s
decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, the entire Court used the word ―rights‖ as a synonym of
privileges and immunities. 343 Thus, the question of the meaning of this clause is: what are the
―rights of U.S. citizens‖?
To answer that question we should begin with the text and interpret it in a way that is
both reasonable and designed to apply principles of freedom, and not those of states rights and
slavery. Such an interpretation begins with the recognition that the text was thought by
contemporaries to be ―clear.‖
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On the campaign trail in 1866, General and future President Garfield told the people that
the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment were ―few in number, easily understood . . . .‖ 344 The
conservative Republican Governor of Ohio, a former Major General in the Union Army, told the
legislature that ―a single statement of these propositions is their complete justification . . . .‖ 345
Professor Rosenthal notes that an editorial in the New York Times termed Howard‘s speech ―clear
and cogent.‖ 346 Further, Professor Thomas notes that ―[q]uite a few newspapers‖ simply quoted
the amendment, acting as if the ―meaning was clear enough.‖ 347 On May 27, 1866, only two
days after Senator Howard‘s speech, the New York Tribune, probably the most influential
newspaper in the country at the time, indicated that debate would be short because the subject
was ―already thoroughly discussed and understood . . . .‖ 348
Justice Swayne indicated that with respect to Section 1:
No searching analysis is necessary . . . . Its language is intelligible and direct. Nothing
can be more transparent. Every word employed has an established significance. There
is no room for construction. There is nothing to construe. Elaboration may obscure,
but cannot make clearer, the intent and purpose sought to be carried out.‖ 349
Contrary to what has been implied, there is absolutely nothing to suggest that the public
at large and the members of the legislatures who ratified the Amendment did not share the
common understandings of the framers in Congress. In spite of the attempts of the executive
branch to prosecute those who violated various provisions of the Bill of Rights, no scrap of
evidence has ever been presented to suggest that it was alleged that the framers committed
―fraud‖ upon any legislature by asking them to ratify an amendment they did not understand. No
scholar who lived through the ratification period claimed that either Bingham or Howard‘s views
344

CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, supra note 63, at ___ (emphasis added). (prior fn.)
1 Ohio Executive Documents 282 (1867), cited and quoted in JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 162 (1984). Though Cox attended Oberlin College and was said to have
been an abolitionist who helped form the Ohio Republican Party, by his term in office Cox opposed voting
by African Americans and advocated ―forced segregation.‖ SIFAKIS, supra note 106, at 148.
346
Rosenthal, supra note ___, at ___. {JCLI 16} While Professor Rosenthal cites this editorial to make a
different point, it is obvious that the writer of the editorial had read the whole speech.
347
Professor Thomas used the words ―indulge in an assumption that its meaning was clear enough.‖
Thomas supra note __, at ___. {JCLI 42} (footnote omitted). If the contemporaries of the amendment
thought its meaning clear, then one might accept their judgment and try to figure out what they thought the
meaning was.
348
May 27 dispatch, N.Y. TRIBUNE, June 1, 1866, quoted in CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND
REUNION, 1864-88, PART I 1295-96 (1971) (emphasis added). For the flaws in Farman‘s own analysis of
the amendment see Brandwein, supra note 277, at 76 to 131 and Aynes, supra note 9. Without reviewing
the whole article, it is difficult to know for sure what the Tribune meant by ―thoroughly discussed.‖ But
there are at least two possibilities. First, they may have been writing about all the discussion of these issues
that had been taking place over many years. Second, they may have been referring to the debates in the
House and the Senate, including the speeches of Congressman Bingham and Senator Howard.
349
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 126 (1873) (Swayne, J., dissenting).
345

60

were unknown to the public. Knowing what we know about the politics of that era, there is no
reason to disbelieve, and every reason to believe, that the members of the legislature either knew
of the debates in Congress and/or shared the common understanding of the privileges of
immunities with members of Congress. 350
Part of the reason for this is because the people of this generation lived through shared
experiences that allowed them to have shared understandings. For example there is a famous
incident where Massachusetts tried to vindicate the rights of its African American citizens under
the Article IV privilege or immunities clause by sending Judge Hoar to South Carolina to meet
with authorities and, perhaps, to even initiate litigation. In 1866 Representative Delano (R-Ohio)
called all of this to his listeners‘ minds with a single sentence: ―I know that you remember when
an able lawyer from Massachusetts was expelled from South Carolina by a Southern mob.‖ 351
To a modern day reader this would not mean much. But to his audience it conveyed a whole
story without even the mention of the able lawyer‘s name or his mission. It was shared
knowledge of events like this which this generation had lived through that allowed the
Republican majority to share common goals and common understandings.
We see this same phenomena when we read Professor Tiedman‘s remarks on why he
thought the Supreme Court was justified in ―amending‖ the Fourteenth Amendment. Tiedman
did not claim that his view or the action of the Court vindicated the will of the people (or their
state legislatures) against a rogue Congress. Rather he was focused upon ―the people‖
themselves, who he thought had been ―blinded by passion.‖ It was ―the popular will‖ that the
Court—though not the Congress—―dared to withstand . . . .‖ 352 The problem was not that the
ratifiers misunderstood the framers, but that they both understood the will of the people and acted
accordingly. 353 From 1868 until 1949 no prominent scholar disputed the clearness of the purpose
of the Amendment or that its purpose had been nullified. While some people lamented this fact,
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the opponents ―manfully‖ (they were all men) admitted that the Amendment was being nullified
and celebrated that fact. 354

355

Speaking of the U.S. Constitution, Senator Timothy Howe (R-Wisc.) said that ―we have
formerly taken the Constitution in a solution of the spirit of States rights. Let us now take it as it
is sublimed and crystallized in the flames of the most gigantic war in history.‖356 Professor Curtis
connects to that the statement of conservative Congressman George Anderson (R-Missouri) that
―we are today interpreting the Constitution from a freedom and not a slavery standpoint.‖ 357
Neither the framers nor the ratifiers intended to continue to interpret the Constitution or the
Amendment from the slavery or states‘ rights points of view. 358
If we look to the Amendment from a ―freedom standpoint‖ this is what we find:
If we look at the plain language of Section 1 and ask ―What are the rights of U.S. citizens?‖, the
most natural meaning is the Bill of Rights and other provisions of the Construction such as habeas
corpus. We might have a vibrant discussion about whether the privilege or immunities (rights of
U.S. citizens) include a ―right to family life‖ 359 or the Jacksonian Democrats‘ anti-monopoly
views. But at the core, there should be no dispute that they include the Bill of Rights. If one
asked what are the rights of U.S. citizens, the average person today and in the 19th century would
answer the Bill of Rights.360
To be sure, private or secret understandings cannot be indulged and can have no effect.
But public statements of the framers made in public fora are certainly strong evidence of the
public understanding of the terms used in the Amendment. Moreover, given Dr. Kyvig‘s insight
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about the affect of combining multiple provisions into one amendment, and the binary choice that
imposed upon the ratifiers, good faith requires that we make efforts to harmonize the views of the
framers and the ratifiers where we can reasonably do so. In this vein, we should not hold the
privileges or immunities clause to a higher standard of proof than we do other constitutional
provisions. Rather, whether we rely upon the new pronouncements of Justice Scalia in Heller361
or the somewhat dated statements of Justice Holmes, 362 the result is the same. If the record in
Heller supports an individual right to bear arms under the Second Amendment, then it applies a
fortiori that the record of the Fourteenth Amendment supports enforcing the principles of the Bill
of Rights against the states.
Howard specifically stated that among the privileges or immunities are the rights
contained in the ―first eight amendments‖; Bingham stated that they will protect the ―Bill of
Rights‖ (at least 7 times including his statements in the discussion of the Civil Rights Act), and
that House Judiciary Chairman Wilson stated the Civil Rights Act will protect the ―Bill of
Rights‖ and that the Bill of Rights need to be enforced. Professor Thomas suggests that
Bingham‘s legal analysis was too complex for ―the public‖ to understand.363 But all of these
public statements—―the bill of rights‖ and ―the first eight amendments‖—were terms ―the
people‖ could understand. 364
Corroborating this view, if we look to the discussion of the abuses against which the
Amendment was to correct, we find claims of violations or of the need for protections such as:
―inalienable rights,‖365 ―individual rights,‖366 ―personal liberty,‖367 ―every right and privilege
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belonging to a freeman,‖368 ―rights of man,‖ 369 ―every constitutional right upon every inch of
U.S. soil,‖370 and ―natural rights.‖ 371 With the exception of ―natural rights,‖372 these terms are
generally broad enough to encompass the rights protected by the Bill of Rights. Even when only
one example—often free speech—is given, it is often made clear that this is only the ―chief‖ right
of the ―rights of man‖ or other general rights about which they were talking. 373 These terms are
terms that ―the people‖ could understand at their core, even if there are disagreements at the
margins. These general claims can all be harmonized with the framers‘ actions in the Congress.
Professor Amar has asked: ―Who wants to campaign against the Bill of Rights?‖ 374
While he was writing about the political campaigns in 1866, there are people today who are
―campaigning‖ against the Bill of Rights. In briefly sketching the history of this campaign, it is
proper to recur to statements of Senator Howe and Congressman Anderson in order to consider
how the constitution has been interpreted in a slavery/states rights ―standpoint.‖ Essentially, it
involved protecting slavery at all costs and being willing to use both states rights and national
power to do so. It included indulging in every possible interpretation against freedom and
embracing every possible interpretation in favor of slavery.
The attempts to defeat the Amendment are rather reminiscence of Confederate General
Joseph E. Johnston‘s ―masterful delaying‖ defense of Atlanta.375 It is said that while he fought
one battle against General Sherman, he had a series of trenches prepared for his troops to retreat
to for the next several battles. At first, we find opponents of the Bill of Rights fighting in the
open. Contemporaries, except for the Democrats in Congress who wanted the amendment to fail,
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thought the language was ―clear.‖376 Historian James McPherson indicates that Americans of the
revolution and later generations considered ―liberty‖ to be the ―birthright‖ of Americans of
European descent and that it ―usually meant‖ ―the rights of states and localities, the freedom of
the press, of speech, of assembly, of religion, the right to security in person and home against
unreasonable search and seizure, the right to bear arms, the right to a trial by jury, the sanctity of
property, and the writ of habeas corpus.‖377
Once the times had changed so that the defeat of the Amendment‘s purpose could no
longer be celebrated,378 the opponents of the Bill of Rights adopted a different strategy and
retreated to the next line of trenches. Those who want to ―campaign‖ against the Bill of Rights
take a variety of approaches, but they all result in a narrower interpretation wrought by using a
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different standard than that used for other amendments379 and other portions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Next, opponents used ad hominine attacks upon Bingham and Howard claiming both
were confused. 380 As the falsity of those claims were uncovered, the opponent claimed that
Howard‘s speech was not reported to the public. 381 Yet Professor Curtis established that it had
been reported in at least three major newspapers382 and Professor Thomas has added two more to
the list. 383 A different approach is to try to claim that the Amendment only guaranteed equal
protection and/or nondiscrimination. But that argument fails because nondiscrimination and
equality were one of the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizenship. If it were the only one, then
there would be no need to use both terms (―privileges‖ and ―immunities‖), and they would be
singular and not plural. A current approach is to look at the Amendment with the proverbial
jaundiced eye and resolve all possible interpretative issues against its ordinary reading and
against being consistent with the explanation of the framers. Any speech, newspaper article, or
other evidence cannot be held to be supportive of harmonizing the view of the framers and the
ratifiers unless it is impossible to imagine some possible ambiguity or inconsistency.
A famous Judge claims that the amendment is only an ―inkblot‖ that he cannot
understand. 384 Yet, as Justice Robert Jackson, no friend to an expansive reading of the
Amendment, recognized that standards were begin applied to the Fourteenth Amendment that had
not been applied to other provisions of the Constitution:
379
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This Court has not been timorous about giving concrete meaning to such
obscure and vagrant phrases as ‗due process,‘ ‗general welfare,‘ ‗equal
protection,‘ or even ‗commerce among the several States.‘ 385
Another trench into which opponents retreat is the one that holds that unless a statement
explicitly states all of the provisions of all of the first eight amendments, it must be supportive of
only ―selective incorporation.‖ 386 Of course, this ignores the fact that the clause includes nonBill of Rights provisions like habeas corpus, right to access to the courts, and other matters.
Further, this is certainly an ungenerous reading of the Amendment and fails any attempt to try to
reconcile the views of the framers with those of the ratifiers. Moreover, it must be recalled that
the very idea of ―selective incorporation‖ was not mentioned in any court case until 1947.387 No
one has produced any citation to any contemporaneous court decision or speaker that suggests
one could divide the Bill of Rights and apply some to the state and not others. To the contrary,
the theories of the time would seem to be more consistent with the second Justice Harlan‘s
assertion, first called to my attention by Professor Thomas: either Section 1 incorporates all of
these rights or it incorporated none.‖ 388
This would suggest that advocating the enforcement of any one of the eight amendments
would support the claim of the floor managers that all are to be enforced. Even if one took a
narrower view than the second Justice Harlan, unless the statement said ―only‖ a certain provision
of the Bill of Rights, it is just as likely to corroborate the framer‘s views as to dispute them. Any
such ambiguities should be resolved in favor of harmonizing the views of the framers and the
ratifiers.
But the continued effort to avoid the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states,
the retreat from one trench into the next, reminds one of the refrain of a popular song in the
1970‘s by Credence Clearwater Revival in the Fortunate Son lines about the tax collector coming
to the house:
And when you ask them ‗How much should we give?‘
Ooh, they only answer More! More! More!‖389
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It seems that no matter how much evidence is produced, how much additional support is
provided for the understanding of both the framers and the ratifiers, or how many false-facts are
exposed, those individuals who oppose the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states
always ask for ―more.‖ I have no doubt that new research will continue to provide new
information on whether or not the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states was
understood by the framers and the ratifiers. But even if it supports such enforcement, I have
doubts that it will ever satisfy those who, for policy reasons, oppose the application of the Bill of
Rights against the states. They will always want ―more.‖
Yet, if we use the star of freedom to guide our interpretation, then we have to fairly
credit the ratifiers and the framers as having adopted the Amendment with the understanding that
it would enforce Bingham‘s ―Bill of Rights‖ and Howards ―first eight amendments‖ against the
states.
B.
The Future
The reconstruction era, the actions of the Congress, and actions of the Courts are
inherently interesting to a number of people both from a historical and a legal standpoint.
Consequently, I would assume that these questions will be with us for the long-term and that at
least a small number of people will continue to research, make new discoveries, develop new
ideas, and analyze these times and the meaning of the Amendment. Though this is only a
surmise, I suspect that the enhanced interest in the area and the increase in the number of scholars
writing in the area today has something to do with the Heller case and the question of whether it
will be enforced against the states. As I have previously noted, this prospect inspires hope for
some and fear for others.390 Further, people who fear the grand jury abuse, no doubt have
concerns that if the second amendment is enforced against the states, then the grand jury
provisions may be as well.
Whether the future of scholarship on the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states
will continue at an enhanced volume or will return to prior levels, depends, in large part, upon the
actions of the Supreme Court. If the Court quickly grants review and either rejects the
enforcement of the Second Amendment against the states or accepts it based upon due process,
then I suspect that the scholarship on the enforcement issue will return to ―normal‖ levels. On the
other hand, if the Court takes the approach it took prior to Batson v. Kentucky391 and allows the
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matter to ―percolate‖ in the lower courts for a number of years, then I suspect scholarship will
continue at an intense pace.392 Similarly, if the Court were to decide to enforce the Bill of Rights
against the states based upon the privileges or immunities clause, then this might signal the
potential for a realignment of the Supreme Court‘s decisions which had previously been based
upon due process and would probably produce a torrent of scholarship.
While we wait to see what the Court will do, I would suggest that we need to
acknowledge that while not everyone agrees, there is nevertheless the ―scholarly consensus‖ of
which Professor Barnett speaks. We need to turn our attention from the old ―incorporation‖
debate (and the use of the approach Professor Lash advocates) and look to the question of what
would be an invigorated privileges or immunities clause due beyond the Bill of Rights. This
process has, of course, been individually pursued by a number of scholars. Moreover, it was the
subject of a major conference at the University of Pennsylvania this past November,393 and will
be the focus of at least one panel at the Law & Society conference in May 2009.
Lincoln said that at the time of the Declaration of Independence‘s proclamation that all
men were created equal, it ―was of no practical use in effecting our separation from Great Britain;
and it was placed in the Declaration, not for that, but for future use. Its authors meant it to be,
thank God, it is now proving itself, a stumbling block to those who in after time might seek to
turn a free people back to into the hateful paths of despotism.‖ 394
Like the Declaration, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment outlines the rights of U.S.
citizens and citizenship in broad terms which can inspire not only leaders and office-holders, but
the people themselves. As my colleague Elizabeth Reilly has noted, Section 1 contains ―stunning
opening phrases‖ that include ―sweeping evocations of individual rights‖ including the privileges
or immunities clause. 395 And the Fourteenth Amendment brings ―hope‖ to all who read it.396
But, unlike the Declaration, the Fourteenth Amendment had a very practical purpose. It was
designed to offer federal protection to the most precious rights of American citizens that pre- and
post-Civil War events demonstrated were so essential. Those who oppose this application of the
Bill of Rights to the states may be acting in good faith, but the effect of their view would be to
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turn the protection of the most important rights over to the states which have shown time and
time again that they are not equal to the task. To fail to provide that protection was, in the past,
and would be in our future, in the words of General, Congressman, and President Hayes, ―wrong
in principle, wrong in its details, and finally wrong as a precedent and example for the future.‖397
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